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TAX TREATMENT OF THE FAMILY: THE CANADIAN
ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION AND
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
It would indeed appear that nobody loves a bachelor!
Professor Harold M. Groves'
In September, 1962, the Canadian government appointed a Royal
Commission on Taxation vested with a broad mandate to
inquire into and report upon the incidence and effects of
taxation imposed by Parliament . . . upon the operation
of the national economy, the conduct of business, the organi-
zation of industry and the positions of individuals; and to
make recommendations for improvements in the tax laws and
their administration that may be consistent with the mainte-
nance of a sufficient flow of revenue.2
More than seven hundred witnesses and three hundred briefs later,3
the Commission in December, 1966, submitted its Report: six volumes
(nearly 2700 pages) of proposals for sweeping revision of the
Canadian federal tax system.4
The Report appears destined for considerable controversy as well
as acclaim. One commentator observes:
IH. GROVES, FEDERAL TAX TREATMNT OF THE FAMILY 28 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as GRoVEs].
2 Order in Council P.C. 1962-1334. Named to the Commission were Kenneth
LeM. Carter, chairman, J. Harvey Perry, A. Emile Beauvais, Donald G. Grant,
Eleanor Milne and Charles E. S. Walls.
3 1 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMIssIoN ON TAXATION xiii (limited ed. 1966)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT].
4 Volume 1 includes an introduction, acknowledgments and minority reports; vol-
ume 2 treats the use of the tax system to achieve economic and social objectives;
volumes 3 and 4 are devoted to the taxation of income; volume 5 covers sales taxes
and tax administration; and volume 6 encompasses implications of the various pro-
posals made in the other volumes.
In regard to the current status of the Commission's proposals, Canadian Finance
Minister Sharp is reported to have stated that no legislation embodying the major
proposals would be presented to Parliament "for some time." Report of the Canadian
Royal Comnission on Taxation, 16 OIL & GAs Q. 179, 180 (1967).
For the rather sketchy commentary appearing to date on the REPORT, see id.;
CANADIAN TAX FOUNDATION, REPORT OF PROCEEINuGS OF THE 19TH TAX CONFERENCE
(1967) [hereinafter cited as CANADIAN TAX FOUNDATION]; Barbeau, The Report:
"The Premise Dictates the Conclusion," 10 CAN. B.J. 153 (1967) ; Goodman, Royal
Commission Would Tax as Income Gifts and Inheritance of Canadians, 26 J. TAXA-
TION 370 (1967); Vineberg, Royal Commission Proposals Would Revolutionize
Canadian Tax System, 26 J. TAXATION 258 (1967).
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The Report is likely to evoke awe and admiration for its
imaginative scope and depth and, at the same time, intensive
criticism and debate on some of its omnivorous accounting
and taxing proclivities.'
Another has called the Report "stern, uncompromising, ungenerous,
tight-fisted and mean." I More broadly, the Report has been deemed
"an ideological manifesto designed to promote a new social order in
Canada . . . as much a political as a fiscal compendium." 7
While the Report is a unified document, many of its features can
be closely examined on their own. Among its more notable proposals
are the following: a "comprehensive tax base" to include gifts and
bequests, inter alia, as ordinary income; elimination of estate and gift
taxation of donors; taxation of capital gains at ordinary income tax
rates; reduction of progressive income tax rates to a maximum of
fifty per cent; and integration of personal and corporate income taxes,
entailing a fifty per cent tax at the corporate level, coupled, upon dis-
tribution of income by the corporation, with a tax refund to the
shareholder based on the difference, if any, between his tax rate and
the corporate rate.
One of the Commission's most provocative and timely recom-
mendations is for adoption of a "family unit" (together with an indi-
vidual unit) for purposes of (1) measuring income and reporting
and paying income taxes, (2) allocating the income tax burden and
(3) attaching tax consequences to transfers of property (including
cash) within and between tax units. The proposed family unit has
been heralded as a "much-needed step in the development of the
equitable income tax." '
This Comment consists of three parts. The Commission's family
unit is discussed first.10 Next, the Internal Revenue Code's treatment
of the family is outlined. Finally, the Commission's family unit is
evaluated with reference to the goals of a tax system and in light of
the shortcomings in the Internal Revenue Code.
5 Vineberg, supra note 4, at 261.
6 Remarks of F. D. Gibson, in CAxADIN TA X FouNDATioN 271.
7 Barbeau, supra note 4, at 153.
8 For recent treatment of the notion of a "comprehensive tax base," see the series
of articles, Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform,
80 HARv. L. REV. 925 (1967) ; Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARv.
L. REv. 44 (1967) ; Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, id. at 63;
Bittker, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Response, id. at 1032 (1968); Galvin,
More on Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Base: The Practicalities of Tax
Reform and the ABA's CSTR, id. at 1016.
9 Remarks of Joseph A. Pechman, in CANADIA TAX FOUNDA'fOx 443.
10 It should be stressed that the Commission's family unit, like most of the Com-
mission's proposals, cannot be fully understood except in the context of the entire
Report. Limitations of space prevent full discussion here.
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I. THFE ROYAL COMMISSION's FAMILY UNIT
Structure
The proposed family unit encompasses five groupings:"
(1) a husband and wife, and any dependent children; 12
(2) a surviving spouse, and any dependent children; is
(3) a divorced or separated parent and one or more de-
pendent children;
(4) one or more dependent children who have been in a
family unit but who are separated from both parents
by reason of the parents' death or residence outside
Canada; and
(5) an individual and one or more dependent children, in
the cases of adoption and unwed mothers.'4
Dependent children are defined as unmarried children, resident in
Canada, natural-born or adopted, and under 22 years of age.'5 In
addition, two options are available. To account for self-sufficiency at
an early age, a child under 22 employed full-time and not living with
his parents can withdraw from the family unit at his or his parents'
option. To account for the full-time university student, a student 22
to 25 years of age can remain a member of the family unit if both he
and his parents so desire.'" Actual support is irrelevant for purposes
of inclusion or exclusion.'
Although other persons, such as an elderly parent, are sometimes
dependent in fact upon, and may be an integral part of, the proposed
family unit, they are excluded from that unit ' and comprise an
113 REPORT 132-33.
12 Common-law marriages qualify so long as the couple have cohabited for one
year and file a joint declaration that they wish to be treated as husband and wife for
tax purposes. Id. at 142. For the definition of dependent children, see text accompany-
ing note 15 infra.
Is For rate purposes a surviving spouse without dependent children is treated as
an individual; however, he or she is deemed to still be in the original family unit so
that transfers of property by the deceased spouse's estate to the surviving spouse con-
stitute intrafamily transfers and hence entail no tax consequences. Id. at 151 n.16.
Intrafamily transfers are discussed in text accompanying notes 49-60 infra.
4 Possible tax units other than the Commission's family unit include the indi-
vidual unit (which the Commission recommends for taxpayers not in a family unit),
the marital unit (husband and wife only), the broad family unit (all relatives living
together) and the household unit (all persons living together).
15 3 REPORT 133. Id. at 151 n.17, suggests that arguably the age should be 18.
Mentally or physically "infirm" children of any age are also considered dependent.
Id. at 133.
10 Id. at 133.
17 Id. at 134.
L8 Id. at 141.
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individual unit. The supporting unit is allowed a tax credit of ten
per cent of all expenditures (up to $1000) made in support of a "close
relative," defined as children who are no longer members of the family
unit, a parent of either spouse, aunts, and uncles. 9
In the usual case, the family unit commences at marriage; it also
commences when an unwed mother retains custody of her child, when a
single person adopts a child, or when a divorced or separated spouse
retains custody of one or more dependents. In the last situation, the
original family unit in effect continues without the other spouse, who
is in yet another family unit if he or she also retains a dependent.
The first tax year for the family unit is the calendar year of its
creation.20
The income of all the unit's members is aggregated. Income is
broadly defined by the Commission to include almost all flows of prop-
erty into the unit-gifts, bequests, and earnings -as well as previ-
ously unrecognized appreciation on property transferred outside the
unit, whether by sale, gift or bequest.2 Transfers of property within
a unit give rise to no tax consequences." Joint and several liability
of husband and wife, in the usual case, is computed with the family
rate schedule. 4 Husband and wife can at their option file separately,
in which case any income of their children must be aggregated with
that of a parent.' However, separate returns almost invariably entail
a higher total tax liability for the family since each spouse's individual
liability is computed by doubling his taxable income, applying the
family unit's rate schedule, and halving the amount due on that income. 6
The family unit terminates upon:
2 7
(1) the death of the last of the unit's members;
19 Id. at 228-29. Complete dependency is not a condition for the credit. Provision
of room and board in the donor's home is deemed to be worth $1000. The recipient,
meanwhile, is required to report the support assistance as income to the extent it
exceeds his $250 annual and $5000 lifetime gift exemption. In view of these exemp-
tions and relatively low tax rates, the Commission foresees little or no income tax
liability for the recipient of such support gifts.
20Id. at 126, 134.
2 1 Transfers for value and loans, inter alia, do not in themselves give rise to income.
For the Commission's discussion of its "comprehensive tax base," see id. at 39-116.
22 Id. at 51.
23For a discussion of transfers within the unit, see notes 49-60 infra and accom-
panying text.
24 3 PEPORT 134-35. A dependent child is liable for the tax attributable to any
amount of the total reported income for which he is responsible. Id. Only his earned
income in excess of $500 and his gifts in excess of a $100 annual exemption must be
reported by the family. Id. at 135, 138.
2  Id. at 126, 134, 189. Presumably the parents can divide the children between
them as they wish.
2G6 Id. at 189. The higher total liability is attributable to the progressivity of tax
rates and results unless husband and wife separately report equal taxable incomes.
See recommended rates, id. at 179, table 11-9.
2
7 Id. at 128-30, 139-40.
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(2) the non-residence of the last of the unit's members;
(3) the remarriage of a surviving spouse, with or without
dependent children;
(4) divorce or legal separation; or
(5) the coming of age of the last dependent child in a family
where the parents are no longer in the family unit.
Allocation of the Income Tax Burden
In its proposed allocation of the income tax burden among
various tax units, the Commission relies on the standard of "ability
to pay." Taxation in accord with "ability to pay" is "achieved when
taxes [are] allocated in proportion to the discretionary economic
power of tax units." . "Discretionary economic power" is the product
of the tax unit's total economic power (defined as the unit's power
to command goods and services for personal use) and the fraction
of that power available for "discretionary use" by the unit, that is,
which does not have to be exercised to maintain the members of the
unit ("maintenance" is defined as "the appropriate standard of living
• . . relative to others")."9 The Commission provides this illustration.
Assume tax units A and B. A has an income of $10,000, one-tenth
of which can be spent at A's discretion. B has an income of $20,000,
two-tenths of which is available for the discretionary use of B. Then,
in accord with the "ability to pay" principle, the relative taxes on
units A and B should be:
Fraction available for
Tax on A Income of A X A's discretionary use
Tax on B Fraction available for
Income of B X B's discretionary use
10,000 X .10 1000
20,000 X .20 4000
To raise $1000 in tax revenues, for instance, a uniform rate of 20
per cent would be imposed on the discretionary income of each unit.
A would pay $200, or 20 per cent of its "discretionary economic
power" of $1000, and B would pay $800, or 20 per cent of its $4000.30
The Commission does recognize, however, that "discretionary economic
28 Id. at 5.
29Id. No specific explication is given of the "appropriate standard" except to
indicate that it is more than "bare subsistence." The "others" are not defined.
30 d. at 6-7.
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power" is not an "objective phenomenon," and proceeds to set forth
three central factors to be considered in ascertaining fractions of a
unit's income available for discretionary use: family responsibilities,
income, and certain non-discretionary expenditures. 31
To recognize differing family responsibilities, the Commission
distinguishes unattached individuals, married couples without de-
pendent children, and couples with varying numbers of dependent chil-
dren. An individual has fewer non-discretionary maintenance ex-
penses than a married couple with the same total income and thus
should pay higher taxes. And while "two cannot live as cheaply as
one," there are economies to marriage and thus as a rule when two
people with the same income marry they should pay more tax than
the sum of their taxes before marriage.32 Dependent children reduce
"discretionary economic power," though in smaller amounts for each
successive child.'
The Commission argues that "[a]t the bottom of the income
scale there are often diseconomies to marriage," 34 notably because after
marrying the parties generally can no longer share living accommoda-
tions with more than one person and, in order to establish a household,
must make expenditures that are greater than the possible savings on
other expenses. Consequently, there should not be an increase in
total taxes at low income levels after marriage takes place. Conversely,
at very high income levels
marital status has relatively little effect on discretionary
economic power. When two wealthy individuals marry,
their total tax should be greater than the sum of the taxes
they paid as single individuals to take into account the
economies of living together, but these economies are small
when compared to their income. The increase in tax upon
marriage for such people should consequently be relatively
smaller than for individuals with less income who marry."
Finally, the Commission argues that account should be taken of
"non-discretionary" gifts to close relatives to provide them with sup-
port,36 special expenses of working mothers with young children, and
extraordinary medical expenses. 7
To implement these goals the Commission recommends separate
rate schedules for individuals and married couples. Use of a single
31 Id. at 7-8.
32 Id. at 14, 142-43.
33 Id. at 17.
34 Id.at 15.
35 Id. at 15-16.
36 See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
373 REPORT 19.
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schedule with either an exemption or a credit to differentiate indi-
viduals from couples is rejected. The exemption is rejected because
To use one schedule for both kinds of units and a fixed
[dollar] exemption for the couple would be tantamount to
the acceptance of the assumption that the extra non-
discretionary expenses of a couple not only increase with
income but increase at the same rate as the marginal rates
of tax increase with income. This we cannot accept. We
believe that when the level of income is substantial, the frac-
tion of additional income for discretionary use is the same
for the couple as for the unattached individual. Adoption
of an exemption would give an unwarranted tax reduction
to upper income couples and would not be sufficiently
generous for low income couples.3s
As to credits,
The adoption of a credit to differentiate the tax on
couples and unattached individuals would pose exactly the
opposite problem. This would be tantamount to the accept-
ance of the assumption that the extra non-discretionary
expenses of the couple do not increase with income. If a
substantial credit were provided, this would be too generous
for low income couples and not sufficiently generous for
middle and upper income couples. 9
Thus the Commission recommends as a middle ground between ex-
emptions and credits the use of separate rate schedules to allow for
a more precise and equitable adjustment.4"
The Commission does, however, reject the extension of separate
rate schedules to distinguish among various kinds of family units, specif-
ically those with different numbers of dependent children. The Commis-
sion argues that because of the various combinations that would be
needed such schedules are not administratively feasible and that, their
"refined technique" notwithstanding, such schedules "would introduce
complexities for taxpayers that would not be justified by the relatively
small amounts involved." "' The Commission rejects use of exemptions
3 8 Id. at 16 (emphasis supplied). The Commission refers to a fixed dollar exemp-
tion, not to a percentage exemption. The former is exemplified by the $600 personal
exemption deduction allowed by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 151. The tax savings at-
tendant upon the exemption are basically a function of the taxpayer's marginal rate
of tax. A fixed percentage exemption, meanwhile, is exemplified by a constant per-
centage of income. Its value also rises with the taxpayer's marginal rate, but is
sharply accelerated by the fact that its amount as well as the marginal rate on that
amount increase with income.
39 Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added). A credit, it will be remembered, is a fixed re-
duction of the tax liability, and by the Commission's definition does not vary with the
taxpayer's income.
o Id. at 17.
41 Id.
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on the ground that actual expenses for children, while probably in-
creasing with income, do not rise as rapidly as the marginal rates
of tax increase with income. Instead, credits are recommended:
Credits against tax are simpler than separate rate schedules
and the inherent bias of fixed credits would be in favour of
low income families as we think it should be.42
The credits are $100 for the first child and $60 for each additional
child.4 3  The Commission acknowledges that these credits
are low in relation to the non-discretionary expenses of
raising children. However, to adopt larger credits would
reduce revenues and necessitate higher marginal rates with
their unfavourable effects on incentives."
In recognition of the additional non-discretionary expenses in-
curred when both parents work, a family unit in which both husband
and wife work for more than 120 days a year is entitled to an $80
credit if there is also a child in the unit; an additional $120 credit is
granted if the child is under seven.45  As discussed above, expenditures
to support a "close relative" give rise to a credit of up to $100, based
on 10 per cent of the support expenditures.4 Finally, a credit "equal to
a substantial proportion (preferably 50 per cent-the top marginal
rate) of the medical expenses in excess of a percentage of income" is
available to the family unit, as well as to the individual unit.47 Again,
credits were chosen to make these adjustments because they are less
complicated than schedules, less costly than exemptions, and provide
a disproportionately greater reduction of "the tax burden on low
income families whose ability to pay is most affected by the additional
non-discretionary expenses ....
Tax Consequences of Transfers Within and Without the Family Unit
Property held by members of a newly formed family unit is usually
not included in the income of the new unit. 9 Only where commence-
2 1Id.
4 3 Id. at 181. This means the following average credits per child for various fami-
lies: one child-$100; two children-$80; three-$73; four--70; five-$68; six--$67.
Id.
4 4Id. at 18.45 Id. at 193.
46 See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
47 3 REPoRT 214. The Commission suggests that the expenses be required to
exceed an unspecified minimum percentage of income before the credit becomes avail-
able. Medical credits in general are apparently considered by the Commission an
"interim solution" pending some form of complete medical insurance coverage. Id.48 Id. at 179-80.
49 Id. at 126, 134. This rule applies to family units formed by marriage of two non-
dependent children, by an unwed mother retaining custody of her child, by a single
person adopting a child, and by a divorced or separated spouse retaining custody of
one or more dependents.
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ment of the family unit coincides with a dependent child leaving
his original family unit is such property income to the new unit."° This
exception is designed to preclude circumvention of the proposed treat-
ment of withdrawal by a child from his family unit, which requires that
property taken by the child constitute income to his new unit." Thus,
dependent children do not avoid the tax consequences of withdrawal
by marriage.
Transfers of property within a family unit involve no tax
consequences:
It is not that [such] transfers . . . would be exempt from
tax; it is simply that these transfers would be removed from
the purview of the tax system.r2
Title can thus be transferred within the unit, be it by sale, gift or
bequest, with no tax consequences; there is no income or gain to be
reported and the property's basis remains unchanged." One exception
is made to this rule. Until a couple has a natural-born child or
until the marriage lasts for five years, tax-free transfers to the other
spouse can be made only in an amount up to one-half of the income
reported by the unit. Any transfers (other than for fair consideration)
in excess of this amount constitute income to the family unit. The
Commission believes this exception necessary "to reduce tax avoidance
through artificially arranged marriages" designed to take advantage
of the tax immunity of transfers."
With two exceptions here relevant, flows of income (broadly
defined by the "comprehensive tax base" ") into and between tax
units are recognized. 6  The relevant exceptions are for gifts to and
earnings of a dependent child, which are eligible for deposit in a
government-administered, interest-bearing "Income Adjustment Ac-
count" in the year of receipt. Amounts so deposited are deducted from
income. Income is recognized when the deposit is withdrawn, which
may be no later than the child's withdrawal from the unit. These
,50 1d. at 138. This rule applies as well, of course, to an individual unit so com-
menced.
5 1 See text accompanying note 58 infra.
52 3 RxPoRT 125.
53 Trusts qualify for this treatment where the beneficiary is a member of the
settlor's family unit. See 4 REPORT 160.
5 3 REP RT 127.
55 See id. at 39-116.
56 Two non-recognition provisions not directly relevant here are for gifts in kind
(the tax on which can be spread over a period of 5 to 10 years) and for amounts
deposited in a government-administered, non-interest bearing "Income Adjustment
Account." (Amounts so deposited do not give rise to taxable income until withdrawn
by the depositor; this Account provision must be distinguished from the dependent
child's Account, treated immediately following in the text above.) 3 REPORT 269,
503-04.
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exceptions are defended on the ground that such amounts do not
increase the "discretionary economic power" of the unit. The gift
exemption is thought necessary to avoid a double tax on large gifts
to a dependent child from outside the unit, which would otherwise be
taxed first to the family and then to the child upon his withdrawal
from the unit. For a similar reason the child's employment or business
income in excess of a proposed $500 exemption is eligible for deposit.5 7
A member is deemed to have withdrawn from the family unit in
a number of circumstances, notably when a child ceases to qualify as
a dependent (by coming of age, marrying or opting out) and when a
member dies or becomes a non-resident. Two tax consequences
follow: first, previously unrecognized appreciation of property taken
by the withdrawing member constitutes income to the family unit in
the year of withdrawal; and second, the withdrawing member includes
in the income of his new unit the fair market value of the property
taken in excess of his $5000 lifetime and $250 annual gift and bequest
exemptions."8 The exemptions are thought sufficient to ensure that
most new units commenced by the child's withdrawal are free of tax
upon formation.59
A family unit terminates in one of two basically different ways.
First, if the unit ends by the death or non-residence of the last of the
unit's members or by the remaining member(s) coming of age,
there is (1) income to the unit in the amount of previously unrecog-
nized appreciation of property which thereby passes from the unit
and (2) income to the recipient unit (be it another family unit or an
individual one), if any. In other circumstances, no tax consequences
attend termination. This results on the remarriage of a surviving
spouse (with or without children), on divorce or legal separation, and
on the marriage of an unwed person with a dependent child.6"
Policy Objectives
As outlined above, the family unit constitutes a single tax unit for
three purposes: measuring income and paying income tax, allocating
the income tax burden among various units, and attaching tax
consequences to transfers of property within and between units.
571d. at 135-36.
58Id. at 137-38. The $5000 lifetime exemption does not accrue until an individual
ceases to be a dependent. Id. In the case of withdrawal by death, property taken
from the unit is that property bequeathed to persons outside the decedent's family unit.
In the cases of death and non-residence, the withdrawing member does not form or
become part of a new unit.
5o d. at 137-38. A dependent child is thus free of income tax on account of prop-
erty taken into his new unit upon withdrawal (i.e., property he receives from his
earlier deposits, if any, in the Account, plus any other property he may possess on
leaving the family) to the extent the fair market value of such property does not
exceed $5250. Amounts in trusts created by a member of the family and of which he
is beneficiary are included in the property deemed taken. 4 REPoRT 175. The general
income averaging provisions are also available. See 3 REPORT 138, 276-80.
60 3 REPoRT 128-30, 139-41.
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For these purposes, the Commission's choice of the family unit 6'
proceeds from its assertion that a tax system should reflect "the basic
economic and financial entity" in society.6" The Commission argues
that upon marriage a couple "adopts the economic concept of the
family as the income unit" and that it is "the continued income and
financial position of the family which is ordinarily of primary concern,
not the income and financial position of the individual members." "
Husband and wife thus act as a unit. As the family grows by the
addition of children, the family continues to pool its resources and
make decisions and expenditures on a group basis." As a corollary
of this unity, the Commission regards taxation of transfers of property
between members of a family as "wrong in principle" and gift and
death taxes on these transfers as anachronistic."
Then as children come of age, marry, opt out or leave Canada,
they are viewed as forming their own economic units and ceasing to
be members of their original families. Any other person, even if in
fact a full, functioning member of the family in social and economic
terms, is excluded from the family unit. The Commission argues that
it would "unduly complicate the family unit concept" to allow such
persons to become members of the family unit for tax purposes "be-
cause it would require elaborate provisions to prevent tax-free
transfers between generations." 66
Intertwined with the social and economic justification for the
family unit is the overriding objective of the entire Report: equity,
both horizontal and vertical. The Commission defines horizontal
equity as individuals and families in similar circumstances bearing the
same taxes, vertical equity as those in different circumstances bearing
appropriately different taxes.6'
On the horizontal level, the individual unit is depicted by the
Commission as inequitable in two respects. First, the total tax
liability of a family whose members are taxed as individuals can vary
between two families with the same total income depending on the
distribution of income among the members of the respective families:
due to the progressivity of income tax rates, the more even the dis-
tribution of income within a family the less its tax liability.' Second,
01 Canada presently employs only the individual unit for income tax purposes,
with no aggregation except indirectly through a $1000 deduction allowed a husband
for his wife (reduced by the amount of her income in excess of $250) and a deduction
($300 or $550) for a dependent child whose income does not exceed $950. Id. at 117,
180. Gift and death taxes are presently applicable, inter alia, to transfers between
members of a family. 1 REPoRT 18-19.
82 3 REPORT 124.
63 Id. at 123.64 Id. at 123-24. The Commission acknowledges that a child's income may have
only an indirect bearing on the family income. Id.
65 1 REORT 18-19.
66 3 REPORT 228.
671 REPORT 4-5.
68 3 REPORT 118, 143.
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the individual unit allows for income splitting (here meaning the de-
flection of income, whether or not the transaction giving rise to the
deflection is motivated by tax minimization) between members of the
family,69 as by the transfer of income-producing property, by family
trusts and partnerships, and so forth.7' For the Commission, different
distributions of income and income splitting within families should not
give rise to different tax liabilities.7'
In vertical as well as horizontal terms, the Commission believes
that only by treating families as entities can their "discretionary
economic power" be satisfactorily measured. In turn, it is only through
proper income measurement that family units can be equitably com-
pared with individual units and with one another for purposes of
equitable allocation of the tax burden.
A third major concern of the Commission is that of enforcement
and administration, principally with respect to income tax. At present
the Canadian federal tax system contains complex, stringent provisions
designed to nullify the income tax effects of family income splitting.72
Witnesses before the Commission termed these provisions "incon-
sistent and discriminatory as between taxpayers" (thereby a departure
from horizontal equity) and "too rigid and restrictive in dealing with
relationships between spouses." 73 For example, a salary paid to a
wife by her husband may be deductible to the husband's business if the
business is incorporated, but not otherwise.74 Implementation of the
family unit would, the Commission hopes, allow for the repeal of the
provisions against family income splitting and thus eliminate attendant
administrative and enforcement problems.75
39 Id. at 120.
70 Literature on income splitting techniques is voluminous. See, e.g., Alter, The
Family Business, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 755 (1958) ; Davies, Shifting of
Family Income for Tax Purposes, 6 ST. Louis U.L.J. 281 (1961) ; Yohlin, Assign-
ieit and Deflection of Income, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 147 (1962) ; Note,
Family Partnerships and the Federal Income Tax, 41 IND. L.J. 684 (1966).
71 A similar rationale supports the Commission's provision of tax immunity for
intrafamily property transfers. Transfer tax burdens can differ between various
families, depending upon the legal ownership of family assets, the inter vivos gifts
made, and the circumstance of which spouse dies first. The Commission provides this
illustration. Families A, B and C have each accumulated $200,000. Presumably, both
husband and wife have contributed to this amount in one way or another. In A all
the assets are owned by the husband and in B by the husband and wife, one-half each
(as a result of gifts or otherwise). If the husbands in A and B die before their wives,
the estate tax will be much greater for family A than B. If in each family the wife dies
first, family B will pay much heavier estate taxes. Meanwhile, family C might avoid
estate taxes on the deaths of both spouses by having part of its assets accumulated in
trust for the children. And if the husband in A makes a substantial gift before death
to his wife or children, a gift tax might result that families B and C would have
avoided. These inequalities are eliminated by removing intrafamily transfers of prop-
erty from the purview of the system. See 3 REPORT 119-20.
72 For a discussion of these provisions, see E. Mockler, J. Smith & C. Frenette,
STUDIES OF THE ROYAL CoaiaussloN ON TAXATION, TAXATION OF THE FAMILY 3-38
(the Studies were prepared for the Commission and not by it).
73 3 REPORT 121.
74 1 REPORT 18; 3 REPORT 122; for additional anomalies see id. at 121.
75 1 REPORT 18.
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II. THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE'S TREATMENT OF THE FAMILY
The Internal Revenue Code's treatment of the family is often and
intensely maligned."0 The Code's patchwork treatment stands in
marked contrast to the comprehensive family unit of the Commission.
Recognition of the Family
The Code does not formally recognize the family as an entity;
however, a taxpayer's marital and family relationships are taken into
account for some purposes. Separate rate schedules are maintained
for married couples, surviving spouses with dependent children,17 and
heads of households; ' dependency exemptions are provided; 9 de-
ductions are allowed for certain alimony payments,"' medical expenses
for dependents,"' and expenses for care of certain dependents; 82 no
deduction is allowed for certain losses, expenses and interest with
respect to transactions between brothers, sisters, spouses, ancestors and
lineal descendants; " constructive ownership through spouses, children,
.grandchildren, and parents is employed in the treatment of certain
corporate distributions and adjustments; ' a deduction of up to one-
half of the adjusted gross estate is allowed for bequests to the surviving
spouse; 5 gifts by one spouse to a person other than his spouse may,
with consent, be treated as if given one-half by each spouse; I and a
gift to a donor's spouse entitles the donor to exclude one-half of the
gift in computing his taxable gifts for the year.81
On the other hand, individual family members often are-or, at
their discretion, can be-treated as isolated units: husband and wife
can file individual income tax returns 88 and unmarried persons, in-
cluding dependent children, must; 89 gains on sales to spouses, children
and certain other relatives are recognized as income,9 as are gifts 9'
and bequests 92 to spouses, children and other relatives.
716See, e.g., GRovEs, upra note 1, at 3: "A considerable number of [tax] critics
. . . are firmly convinced that our present tax treatment of the family is irrational
and inexpedient."
77 INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 2.
78 Id. § 1 (b).
79 Id. § 151.
80 Id. § 215.
8 1 Id. § 213.
82 Id. § 214.
83Id. § 267.
84 Id. § 318.
85 Id. § 2056.
8 6 Id. § 2513.
8 7 Id. §2523.
88 Id. §1.
89 In certain circumstances, a surviving spouse who has not remarried can file
jointly with the deceased spouse. Id. §§ 2, 6013.
90 Id. §§ 267, 1002.
91 Id. § 2501.
!2 Id. § 2001.
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Dependent children are not, for purposes of income measurement
and income tax assessment, included in their parents' unitY Prior to
1948 there were a few suggestions that the income of minor children
be reported with that of the parents. 4  Apparently, the question of
children's income was not considered by Congress at the time of the
1948 tax reforms." Since then some attention has been given to the
question and reportedly "many tax scholars" now favor inclusion of
minor children in the parents' unit. 6  Some would limit the inclusion
to a child's property income or, more narrowly, to a child's income
deriving from property received initially from a parent.
7
Criticism of independent income taxation of children is based
largely on equitable grounds. In terms of horizontal equity, families
with the same total income are unequally treated depending upon how
the income is distributed among the members. The distributions of
income within a family can often be affected by various income splitting
devices." In terms of vertical equity, there are two flaws in exclusion
of children. One is that the income of children in high income families
is taxed at the lowest marginal rates, if at all, when in fact the chil-
dren's income is available, at least beneficially and indirectly, to the
parents. 9  The other involves the double $600 exemption possible in
the case of a child who is a student, under 19 years of age, or earns
less than $600 annually. The double exemption arises when a child
takes the exemption on his return 100 and the parents, if qualifying,
claim him as a dependent and take a similar exemption in their
return.1 1  This means discrimination against lower income families
because the parents are less likely to qualify for the dependency ex-
emption (which requires provision of one half the child's support),
lower income families being able to contribute less to the child's support
while the child is more likely to be making a substantial contribution
93 Two other areas of criticism-treatment of heads of households and working
wives-arguably functions of structured recognition, are treated under burden alloca-
tion infra at notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
94D. THORSON, THE SELECTION OF A TAX UNIT UNDER THE INCOME TAX: THE
INDIrVuAL UNT VERSUS THE FAMILY UNrT 75 (1962) (unpublished doctoral thesis
submitted to the University of Wisconsin) [hereinafter cited as THORSON, SELECTION
OF A TAX UNIT]. For several such suggestions, see DmsioN OF TAX RESEARCH,
U.S. TREAStRY DE"T, THE TAX TREATMENT OF FAMILY INCOME, reprinted in Hear-
ings on Proposed Revisions of the Internal Code Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 846, 861-63, 865-66 (1947); Ervin, Federal Taxes
and the Family, 20 S. CA. L. REv. 243, 247-48 (1947).
95 THORsoN, SELEMCON OF A TAx UN T 242.
96 Thorson, An Analysis of the Sources of Continued Controversy over the Tax
Treatment of Family Income, 18 NAT'L TAx J. 113, 130 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Thorson, Tax Treatment of Family Income].
97 See GROVES, supra note 1, at 42, 100.
98 The inequity is facilitated by the fact that earned income cannot be split, or
dispersed, within the family while unearned income can be.
99 A child's income is taxed to him even if payments for his services are made to
his parents. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 73.
0l Id. § 151(b).
-10 Id. §§ 151(e), 152.
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on his own.10 2  It also means that qualifying families receive a $1200
exemption for the child, with a limiting effect on the progressivity of
the tax rate applied to the total family income.
Allocation of the Income Tax Burden to Families
The least reasonable and most criticized aspect of the Code's
treatment of the family is the allocation of income taxes among single
persons and families. The Code's treatment appears to be more acci-
dental than coherent. Joseph A. Pechman has observed that it is
indeed "time to clean up the messy and arbitrary differences in the
tax burdens of single and married people." 103
The central feature of allocation between single persons and
couples under the Code is the split-income rates allowed couples."0 4
Under this provision, a couple halves its taxable income and pays a
tax of twice the tax liability on the half.0 5 Heads of households, mean-
while, receive one half the split-income advantage.0 6 The following
table illustrates the impact of split-income rates.
10 7
Percentage
Rate on Rate on Tax on Tax Reduc- Reduction
Taxable Single Joint Single tion on on Tax on
Income Return Return '0 8  Return Joint Return Joint Return
$ 500 14.0% 14.0% $ 70 $ 0 0%
1,000 14.5% 14.0% 145 5 3%
2,000 15.5% 14.5% 310 20 6%
3,000 16.7% 15.0% 500 50 10%
6,000 18.7% 16.7% 1,130 130 10%
10,000 21.9% 17.2% 2,190 470 22%
14,000 25.4% 19.7% 3,550 790 22%
20,000 30.4% 21.9% 6,070 1,690 28%
26,000 34.8% 24.6% 9,030 2,650 29%
32,000 38.2% 26.9% 12,210 3,550 29%
40,000 41.7% 30.3% 16,670 4,530 28%
50,000 46.4% 34.1% 22,590 5,530 24%
100,000 55.5% 45.2% 55,490 10,310 19%
200,000 62.7% 55.5% 125,490 14,510 13%
400,000 66.4% 62.7% 265,490 14,510 5%
Split-income rates are subject to sharp criticism not only with
respect to differentiation between single persons and couples but for
102 Cf. GRovEs upra note 1, at 39-41. The inequity is compounded by the greater
worth, in taxes saved, of exemptions to higher tax bracket families.
10 Pechman, Income Splitting, 1 TAx REvisiow COMPENDium 473, 486 (1959)
(paper submitted to House Comm. on Ways and Means).
104 Split-income rates are to be distinguished from income splitting, see text ac-
companying notes 69-70 supra, which is income deflection or dispersion through devices
such as trusts or gifts of income-producing property.
115 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2.
1006J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLicY 83-84 (1966). INT. Rev. CODE OF 1954,
§ 1(b) (1), provides the rate schedule for heads of households, as defined by § 1 (b) (2)
& (3).
107 Figures are based on INr. Rev. CODE OF 1954, § 1(a) (2).
108 The rate is arrived at by dividing the tax by the taxable income.
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their effect on progressivity as well.1"' As the table indicates, middle
and upper income couples receive a substantial tax reduction, a maxi-
mum of 29 per cent at the $26,000-$32,000 level. Approximately
66.5 per cent of all returns either cannot claim the benefits of splitting
or receive little benefit from it and only about 17 per cent of all
returns receive significantly more than a $40 benefit."' The revenue
lost by the use of split-income rates instead of individual reporting was
estimated in 1959 to be over $4 billion a year."-
The net result of split-income rates, therefore, is a disproportionate
reduction to middle and upper income couples (especially the latter) at
the ultimate expense of single persons and lower income couples." 2
Even without recalling the Royal Commission's goal of sensitive
adjustments in relation to the economies of marriage at various income
levels,1 3 split-income rates are clearly haphazard and inequitable.
Split-income rates originated in 1948. Their adoption has been
attributed to "historical developments rather than design" and to
"political compromise dictated by a high-pressure historical situa-
tion." 114 Split-income rates resolved two problems: the discrimination
in favor of couples in community property states who could split their
income in separate returns while couples in other states could not, and
the unequal treatment of couples with like incomes in non-community
property states based on the distribution of income between husband
and wife, with the least tax liability arising from an equal distribu-
tion.' : Aggregation of the incomes of husband and wife was a logical
step in the resolution of these problems; split-income rates as a means
of burden allocation was not.
Split-income rates have been popular, despite their flaws, and
Congress has not seriously considered alternatives.'" Nonetheless,
justifications for their disparities are few. One is that the benefits
accruing to middle and upper income families are appropriate in view
of the alleged failure of personal exemptions to provide adequate relief
for the costs of raising children. However, lower income couples may
also have children; and split-income rates at any event do not dis-
tinguish between childless and childbearing couples." 7  It is also argued
109See, e.g., J. DUE, GOVERNMENT FINANCE 155-56 (1959); Musgrave, How
Progressive is the Income Tax? 3 TAx REvisOiN COMPENDIUm 2223 (split-income
treatment "punctures the pattern of progression . . . in an arbitrary and inequitable
fashion") ; Pechman, supra note 103, at 473-86.
110 GROVES, supra note 1, at 72-73.
l1 Pechman, supra note 103, at 474.
112 Professor Groves terms the treatment of singles "unconscionable." GRoVEs,
stupra note 1, at 106.313 See notes 35-39 supra and accompanying text.
114 GROVES, supra note 1, at 17, 59. Accord, Oldman & Temple, Comparative
Analysis of the Taxation of Married Persons, 12 STAN. L. REV. 585, 593-94 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Oldman & Temple].
115 Pechman, supra note 103, at 473.
113J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAx PoLcy 84 (1966).
117 Id.
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that splitting eliminates the disincentive to a wife's working inherent in
income aggregation. 18 A third defense is that it is "a necessary in-
centive for advancement to executives and professional people." 119
The Code further differentiates on the basis of marital status and
family responsibility through the personal and dependency exemptions,
allowing $600 deductions for the taxpayer, his spouse, and each of his
qualifying dependents.' It is helpful to consider at the same time
the standard deduction of up to $1,000, computed as the larger of
10 per cent of adjusted gross income or $200 plus $100 for each
exemption claimed under section 151.1 The standard deduction is,
in a sense, simply an additional exemption, 2 and is claimed on about
65 per cent of all returns.m
The following table indicates the extent to which the $600 ex-
emptions and standard deduction insulate income from taxation among
various family groupings. Included in the table are comparative
figures based on data contained in a Study by the Survey Research
Center, Institute for Social Research, at the University of Michigan
with respect to costs of living and the percentages of these covered by
the minimum amounts of income insulated by the exemptions.2 4
11
8 See GROVES, supra note 1, at 76.
119 See GROVES, supra note 1, at 76-77. A related defense is that increasing the tax
burden on upper income taxpayers would only lead to higher professional charges to
offset the increase, which in turn would pose the prospect of inflation. Brenner, An
Inquiry into the Possibility of Lowering the Tax Rates by Increasing the Tax Base
through Elimination of Income Splitting, 1 TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM 487, 492
(1959).
120 INT. REV. CoDE oF 1954, §§ 151, 152. For a discussion of various rationales of
exemptions, see GROVES, supra note 1, at 23-26; Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base"
as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARv. L. REV. 925, 940-43 (1967) ; Kassalow,
To Restore Balance and Equity in Family In-come Taxation, 1 TAx REVISION Comt-
PENDIUM 515 (1959); Pechman, What Would a Comprehensive Individual Income
Tax Yieldf, id. at 251, 266, 267. For consideration of the alleged inadequacies of the
exemptions in view of the various rationales, see GROVES, supra note 1, at 29, 45;
J. PEC MAN, FEDERAL TAx POLICY 69-70 (1966). For the revenue costs of the ex-
emption and of increasing the $600 amount, see id. at 71; Bittker, A "Comprehensive
Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925, 940 (1967) ;
Magill, Federal Income Tax Revision, 1 TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM 87, 92 (1959).
For alternative forms of exemptions, see GROVES, supra note 1, at 34-38; Note, A Pro-
posed Flexible Personal Exemption for the Federal Incomw Tax, 18 STAN. L. REV.
1162 (1966).
1 2 1 IN-. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 141. Where husband and wife file separately, the
deduction is reduced. Id. § 141(c), (d).
122 GROVES, supra note 1, at 43. The standard deduction is an additional exemp-
tion in that it is an automatic deduction in computing taxable income. However, it is
taken in lieu of itemizing specific deductions and thus is not a free, automatic deduc-
tion for all taxpayers.
13 Seltzer, The Place of the Personal Exemption in the Present-Day Income Tax,
1 TAX RmSION COMPENDIUM 505 (1959).
124 J. MORGAN, M. DAVID, M. COHEN & H. BRAzER, INCOME AND WELFARE IN THE
UNITED STATES 189 (1962) [hereinafter cited as MORGAN]. The figures are provided
for the purposes of comparison and not to point up the adequacies or inadequacies of
the exemptions with respect to a minimum cost of living, subsistence, etc.
It is assumed that the husband is employed, the wife not employed; costs for
children are averaged for different aged children.
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Exemptions and
Minimum
Standard Cost of Per cent of
Taxpayer Deductions Living Coverage
Individual $ 900 $2,284 39
Husband and Wife 1,600 3,038 52
Husband and Wife
plus
1 child 2,300 3,688 62
2 children 3,000 4,278 70
3 children 3,700 4,926 75
4 children 4,400 5,682 78
5 children 5,100 6,332 81
The ratio between the above exemptions is .6 (single) :1.0 (couple):
1.4 (couple with child) : 1.9 (couple with two children). In marked
contrast, the cost of living ratio from the above table is: .7 (single) :
1.0 (couple): 1.2 (couple with child) : 1.4 (couple with two children).
Professor Groves and Joseph A. Pechman report similar ratios on the
basis of other cost of living studies."2 In relative terms, therefore,
couples and their children receive exemptions considerably out of pro-
portion, from a cost of living standpoint, to those allowed single
persons.'26
The Code is also criticized for its failure to take direct account
of a wife's employment. Split-income rates, it will be remembered,
do not distinguish between income-earning and non-income-earning
wives. The appropriateness of such a distinction is clear.1 7  Ap-
parently, the matter received no consideration by Congress in 1948 and
only slight consideration in 1954.' The Code indirectly accounts for
a working wife's expenses (or imputed income lost) by conceding a
working mother a deduction up to $900 for expenses of caring for
children infirm or under 13 years of age, if incurred "for the purpose
of enabling the taxpayer [a woman or widower, or husband whose wife
is incapacitated or institutionalized] to be gainfully employed." "2 The
'25 GROVES, supra note 1, at 28 n.15; J. PECamAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 67-69
(1966).
126 See notes 100-01 suPra and accompanying text.
'27 See, e.g., GROVES, supra note 1, at 17 ("Differentiation between married
couples with two jobs and those with one is at least as compelling as that between
married couples and single persons") ; Atlas, Personal Exemptions, 1 TAx RmSiON
COMPENDIUM 525, 530 (1959); Oldman & Temple 603; Thorson, Tax Treatment of
Family Income 116.
'26 THoRsoN, SE.ECTION OF THE TAx UNIT 243.
'29 INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 214.
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deduction has been castigated as inadequate and less than one half
what it should be.3 '
Finally, the Code is criticized for its treatment of heads of house-
holds. 8 ' Section 1 (b) provides one half the split-income benefit 132 to
an unmarried taxpayer who maintains a household which is the prin-
cipal place of abode of his child or a section 151 dependent, including a
parent. Section 2 allows a surviving spouse with a section 151 de-
pendent child living at the spouse's place of abode full split-income
benefit for two years after the death of his spouse. The provisions are
faulted on a number of grounds. One is that, in the case of section
l(b), one half the split-income benefit is insufficient. It is argued
that heads of households may have no greater taxpaying ability than
some married couples with the same taxable income. Another is the
requirement that the dependent live with the taxpayer, when in fact
the cost of supporting the dependent elsewhere may be more costly.13
A House proposal in 1954 to liberalize the head-of-household pro-
vision to allow full splitting (irrespective of whether the dependent
lived with the taxpayer) was rejected by the Senate.'3 Professor
Groves states that "[p]robably most critics would agree that the
rationale of all these classifications is tenuous." 135
Taxation of Intrafamily Property Transfers
As a general rule, transfers of property between members of a
family are within the purview of the Code and are subject to transfer
taxation, in the case of gifts and bequests, and to income tax in the
case of transfers for value. Several Code provisions qualify this rule.
Section 267 provides that losses on certain sales between related tax-
payers are not recognized. For estate tax purposes, section 2056 al-
lows as a deduction from a decedent's gross estate "an amount equal
to the value of any interest in property which passes or has passed
from the decedent to his surviving spouse . . . to the extent that such
interest is included in determining the value of the gross estate," up
to one half the value of the adjusted gross estate. For gift tax pur-
poses, section 2523 allows a donor a deduction (in computing taxable
gifts) of one half the value of his gifts to a spouse. No provisions ex-
pressly immunize intrafamily gifts and bequests to children, although
children may of course benefit indirectly from the limited immunity
130 GROVES, sup-ra note 1, at 82. For interesting statistics on the frequency and
costs of child care, see MORGAN 111-12 (indicating, inter alia, that of two-job families
with children under six years of age-presumably the age of entry into school-one
half do not pay anything for child care).
13 1 See, e.g., GRoVEs, supra note 1, at 17, 69; J. PECHMAx, FEDERAL TAX POLICY
84 (1966) ; Pechman, supra note 103, at 481-85.
132 J. PECHEAm , FEDERAL TAx POLICY 83 (1966).
333 Pechman, upra note 103, at 482.
134 GRoVEs, supra note 1, at 69; Pechman, supra note 103, at 482-83.
35 GROVES, vipra note 1, at 69.
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granted interspousal transfers. Also, spouses and children may benefit
from the $60,000 estate tax exemption of section 2052 and $3,000
annual and $30,000 lifetime gift tax exemption of sections 2503(b)
and 2521, respectively.
Sections 2056 and 2523 were new to the Code in 1948, and, like
the split-income rates of that year, were the result of "a political
compromise dictated by a high-pressure historical situation and .
were hardly a deliberate choice made after all the equities and other
consequences were weighed." 1 16 In purpose the sections represent an
attempt to equalize federal estate and gift tax treatment of spouses in
common law states with those in community property states. Their
failure to fully achieve this objective is often decried.'37
Critics of transfer taxes on interspousal transfers are legion. After
a conference of experts on federal estate and gift taxation sponsored
by the Brookings Institution, Carl Shoup reported that a majority of
the conferees favored complete interspousal immunity.1' Professors
Casner and Andrews, in their recent work on the American Law
Institute Federal Estate and Gift Tax Project, have recommended
complete interspousal immunity from transfer taxation. 3 9  Professor
Casner states the case for the critics:
[Immunity] is designed to simplify the handling of property
dispositions between husband and wife; to lessen the eco-
nomic adjustment that may now be required, when the earning
power of a spouse ceases on death, by making it possible to
avoid any transfer tax payment at such time; to make the
impact of the transfer tax felt in the same degree regardless
of the state in which the transferor resides; and to carry out
the philosophy of the average husband and wife who regard
the property they own as "our" property.'40
There is likewise considerable criticism of the Code's failure to
provide immunity to certain parent-child transfers. The criticism has
focused on bequests, stressing the inequity of taxing bequests to de-
pendent children and students for their support and education. Had
the parent lived, there would have been no transfer tax on such
amounts. As already mentioned, some such amounts can be trans-
ferred to the child indirectly and free of taxation by bequest to a
surviving spouse who can in turn provide the child with support and
136Id. at 59-60.
137See, e.g., J. PECHMAN, FEDERA TAx POLICy 186 (1966); C. SHOUP, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIrT TAxEs 51-52 (1966) [hereinafter cited as SHour]. See generally
38 CAUlF. L. REv. 1-182 (1950); 22 TAx L. Rxv. 515-684 (1967).
'38 SHOUP 122; cf. DeWind, The Approaching Crisis in Federal Estate and Gift
Taxation, 38 CAit.Im L. REv. 79, 110 (1950).
ISO Andrews, The Accessions Tax Proposal, 22 TAx. L. REv. 589, 592 (1967);
Casner, American Law Institute Federal Estate and Gift Tax Project, id. at 515.
140 Casner, supra note 139, at 549.
1968]
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education. The participants in the Brookings conference referred to
above agreed that some allowance should be made for bequests made
to children."" One proposed set of mechanics would allow an estate
with no surviving spouse a $3,000 deduction for each year by which
each recipient child is under 21 years of age.' Bills have been intro-
duced in Congress to ease the tax on transfers to dependent children.'43
III. AN EVALUATION
Complete and accurate evaluation of the Commission's family unit
will be possible, if ever, only after implementation of statutory pro-
visions which evolve from the proposal. Even then the evaluation will
depend upon other components of the tax system into which the family
unit is introduced. What follows is an examination of the Com-
mission's family unit on three interrelated levels. The principle level
is theoretical, apart from either the full context of the Report or that
of the Internal Revenue Code, and confronts the question how the
family should be treated by a tax system. The second level consists
of evaluation of the family unit in the context of the Report, including
the Income Adjustment Account and treatment of gifts and bequests as
income. Third, and least emphasized, is analysis in the context of the
Internal Revenue Code, notably with respect to its transfer taxation.
Structure
An income tax system must initially define the appropriate tax
unit or units. Income must be measured and reported, assessments and
payments made. While the tax unit is a necessary first step, the focal
point of an income tax system is, of course, its allocation of the tax
burden.'" In turn, the choice of units is one focal point of the contro-
versy over allocation of the burden among various family and indi-
vidual groupings at various income levels. Given a philosophy of
progressive taxation-whatever, exactly, it may be 46-- that takes
141 SHouP 122-23, 132.
142 Id. at 59.
'43 E.g., H.R. 1845, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). See also Children's Estate Tax
Deduction, Hearings on H.R. 7924 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
It will be recognized that the support and education argument for an allowance on
bequests to minor children is inapplicable to inter vivos gifts and to bequests in excess
of the child's support and education needs during minority.
144 See, e.g., GRovEs, supra note 1, at 105, BarrisH ROYAL CommISSION oN TE
TAXATION OP PROFITS AND INCOME, Second Report, 116, at 35 (1954).
14r See, e.g., Oldman & Temple 585.
146 A precise philosophy of progressive taxation is of course basic to tax treatment
of the family. As Professor Groves has noted, "Underlying all of the specific problems
of family taxation are conflicting philosophies of equity in taxation." GaovEs, supra
note 1, at 3. Full discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this Comment;
however, they are confronted briefly in the discussion of allocation of the income tax
burden at text accompanying notes 190-92 infra.
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account of personal circumstances,' 47 the tax unit should then be
structured to facilitate this philosophy, as well as such other goals of
taxation as enforcement and administration.
The Commission appears quite correct in recommending a supple-
ment to Canada's present individual unit. To be sure, the individual
unit has been defended from time to time. A. P. Herbert once declared
that combining the incomes of husband and wife "is in effect a tax
upon marriage and a tax upon virtue." 148 Further, it has been argued
that, conceptually,
the family as a unit has no combined taxpaying ability per se;
that its taxpaying ability is composed of the separate tax-
paying abilities of its individual members; and that the
taxpaying ability of each of these is determined by the amount
of income of which he or she is the owner without reference
to the income of other members of the family. 4
Japan, Australia and many of the states in this country use only the
individual as an income tax unit.
Nonetheless, the case for inclusion of husband and wife as a
single unit is compelling. The Commission's analysis of the economic
and social utility of husband and wife, and the equitable, administra-
tive and enforcement advantages of the family unit' 50 amply explain
the broad consensus among tax critics.' 51  Equally well entrenched-
at least since the 1948 congressional tax revisions-are the notions
that state-determined property rights 152 and a wife's citizenship or
legal equality 15 3 are not barriers to the inclusion of husband and wife
in one unit.
147The secondary and related question of the propriety of taking account of
various family responsibilities in burden allocation is considered at text accompanying
notes 185-89 infra.
148 A. HmERT, THE Uxcom 0 LAW 237 (1936).
14 9 DMsioN OF TAx RESEARCH, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T., THE TAX TREATMENT OF
FAMILY INCOME, reprinted in Hearings on Proposed Revisions of the Internal Revenue
Code Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 846, 851
(1947). Oldman & Temple, at 603, argue that the individual unit can be justified only
if it is impossible to establish a family unit entailing fewer inequities.
1i0 See notes 61-75 supra and accompanying text.
151 On the financial, economic and decision-making unity of husband and wife,
see E. LEMASTERS, MODERN COURTSHIP AND MARRIAGE 466-68 (1957); MORGAN
23; J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLIcY 83 (1966) (noting that there is less economic
unity at high income levels) ; Oldman & Temple 596-98; Thorson, Tax Treatment of
Family Income 115-16.
152 See, e.g., Thorson, id. at 115. The spirit of the state property rights approach
is apparent in Justice Roberts' opinion in Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) :
We are of opinion that under the law of Washington the entire prop-
erty and income of the community can no more be said to be that of the
husband, than it could rightly be termed that of the wife.
The District Court was right in holding that the husband and wife were
entitled to file separate returns, each treating one-half of the community
income as his or her respective income ....
Id. at 113, 118.
15 See, e.g., GROvES, supra note 1, at 70; Oldman & Temple 602.
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However, a significant problem raised by inclusion of the wife
in the tax unit is that she may be discouraged from working. Aggre-
gation of the wife's income with that of her husband means that her
income is taxed at least at her husband's marginal rate, and most
likely at a higher rate due to the likelihood that the combined incomes
will fall into a higher bracket.' But because a wife's income probably
gives the couple greater "discretionary economic power," a greater
tax burden is appropriate.
The Commission, however, unnecessarily discourages wives from
working by failing to make proper adjustment for a working wife's
additional expenses and the imputed income lost to the family.""5
Failure to take account of these items, which in itself departs from the
concept of "discretionary economic power," compounds the inevitable
disincentive resulting from aggregation. The Commission's view is
that while working wives may incur "some additional family house-
keeping expenses," "n[m]any of these expenses are nothing more than
a purchase of increased leisure time and freedom from unpleasant
housekeeping tasks." 'r" The Commission would grant a family unit
with a working mother an $80 tax credit (a reduction of the total tax
the unit would otherwise have to pay) if there are children in the
unit, or $120 if there is a child under seven.'" 7 The family rate
schedule itself does not differentiate between one- and two-worker
families.
Arrayed against the Commission's view of the working wife is a
consensus among economists and tax commentators that a married
couple with a working wife should be treated differently from a couple
in which the wife is not working. This need to differentiate has been
termed as great as the need to differentiate couples from single per-
sons.' - s One study of family budget costs concluded that the annual
cost of goods and services for an employed wife was $1,092, com-
pared with $546 for a nonworking wife.' 59 Arguably the credits for
working mothers compensate in part for the failure to provide a
working wife's allowance, assuming that many working wives are
mothers as well. However, at least some wives would be discouraged
from working; this, it has been suggested, could have considerable
'
5 4 For the changes in tax liability resulting from the aggregation of income of
husbands and wives who would otherwise be taxed as individuals, see 3 REPORT 191
(table 11-15).
15 5 See text accompanying note 159 infra.
156 3 REP'oRT 193, 210 n.22.
157 See note 45 .rpra and accompanying text.
158 See note 127 srupra and accompanying text.
1519 MORGAN 189 (figures from the Community Council of Greater New York,
Budget Standard Service, Annual Price Survey and Family Budget Costs, October,
1959).
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impact on middle class two-job families. 6 '
One of the most debatable aspects of the Commission's family
unit is its inclusion of dependent children. On the theoretical level,
it is clear that the conceptual neatness of including husband and wife
in a unit does not appear in the case of dependent children. A child
is only a temporary member of the family. While it may be true that
"[w] e think in terms of dad, mom, and the kids," 161 pooling and
sharing income with a child does not occur to the same degree as
between husband and wife.'62 A child's income is frequently regarded
as his spending money and outside the family budget, especially in
higher income families; and he is not as directly a part of the
decision-making process within the family as are the husband and
wife. On the other hand, even if there is not always pooling and
sharing with children, there generally is some, and the income of the
child is at least indirectly available to the family as a whole, relieving
the family of some of the child's expenses. 3
It is of course possible that inclusion of dependent children within
the family unit might discourage some children from working.' A
proposal in the state of New York to aggregate a child's income with
that of his parents led some parents to assert that they would ask their
children to stop working. 63 Putting aside the psychological aspects of
inclusion, the incentive argument is not persuasive. A survey con-
ducted in the United States found that only 6 per cent of "spending
units" (defined as a group of relatives living together and pooling
their incomes for major items of expense) contained children under
18 earning money, only 1 per cent contained children earning $500-
999 annually and only 1 per cent contained children earning over
$1,000.66 Such small amounts, especially if an exemption is pro-
vided, would not be likely to raise the family's marginal rate. And,
in the United States at least, the marginal rate for the "vast majority"
16OSee Remarks of Frank E. A. Sander, CANADIAN TAX FouNDATIoN 17, 21.
Presumably, wives in lower income families are in sufficiently great need of income
for consumption purposes that the disincentive is not crucial; upper income wives
inclined to work (of whom there are likely fewer than in lower income families),
meanwhile, arguably are not greatly influenced by the relatively slight amounts repre-
sented by the disincentive.
'I E. MocKLE, supra note 72, at 75.
162D. THORSON, SELECTION OF A TAX UNIT 189.
163id.; see GRovEs, supra note 1, at 34, 70; Surrey, Federal Taxation of the
Family-The Reveme Act of 1948, 61 HA~v. L. REv. 1097, 1114 (1948).
164 As with the working wife, the child's income will be taxed at least at the
family's marginal rate. See text accompanying note 154 supra.
165 N.Y. Times, March 1, 1960, at 1, col. 6.
166 See MORGAN, supra note 124, at 140. These figures are not comprehensive for
purposes of the Commission's family unit because children 19, 20 and 21 are not in-
cluded, nor are students 22-25 who could remain in the family unit Nonetheless, they
are indicative of the slight amounts of earned income that would generally be aggre-
gated with parental income.
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of children will be among the lowest irrespective of inclusion.'67
Furthermore, lower and middle income children of working age often
must work to help to pay for their support and education in any
event. There is little doubt, however, that there will be some dis-
incentive in high income families."
A third point, related to the incentive issue, is the impact of in-
clusion of dependent children's gifts and bequests from persons outside
the family unit. Inclusion means that any income produced by such
property (be it in trust, securities or whatever) is taxed at the
family's marginal rate. This could well discourage the making of
gifts that would increase the family's marginal rate and the amount
of tax directly attributable to the income produced by the donated
property. In turn, increasing the family rate can be said to con-
stitute a disincentive for the child to work.
Fourth, it might be argued that a. sound tax policy would be to
provide low rates for children in order both to encourage them to
work and to subsidize their education. However, as indicated above,
it is unlikely that children would be significantly deterred from working
by inclusion. While inclusion might thwart a policy designed to
subsidize education, it is questionable that encouraging children to
work is the best, or even an appropriate, method of providing for the
expenses of education.
Fifth, it may be argued that inclusion would result in enforcement
problems, principally because increased rates would provide greater
incentive for avoidance.0 9 However, an exemption (such as the
Commission's $500 one) will mitigate the impact of any increase in
rate and such an exemption, combined with the reporting of income
by employers, should solve any problems that do arise.
Finally, aggregation may appear harsh for large, low-income
families in which there may be several working children, each of whom
may receive little support from his parents. An annual exemption,
such as the Commission's $500 for earned income, alleviates this prob-
lem to a considerable degree. As a practical matter, there are few
families with more than one or two working children and their earn-
ings, in themselves or at least in excess of an exemption, are no doubt
generally small.17 ° Further, older children with significant annual
earnings could and presumably would leave the family unit.
In summary, the Commission's case for inclusion of dependent
children is strong if not compelling." On a financial and social
3.7 Harriss, Parent and Child-And Taxes: Some Problems in Dependency, 1 TAx
RxVISION COMPENDIUM 531, 532 (1959).
168 Cf. id.
119 GRoVEs, sipra note 1, at 70.
170 See note 166 supra and accompanying text.
171 It should be noted that other aspects of a tax system can militate against any
single recommendation, including that of inclusion. For example, if adequate tax
relief is not allowed a family for the expenses of raising children then indirect relief
through separate taxation of children may seem more appropriate.
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analysis, they belong in the family unit. As a practical matter, inclusion
should not amount to a significant disincentive for working children
or donors outside the family unit. Inclusion would mean, quite
reasonably, the application of the parents' tax rate to the child's income
in excess of the exemption. It would also be equitable in ending the
advantages of most income splitting within the family. Moreover,
inclusion would end many of the administrative problems of enforce-
ment of statutory provisions 172 and judicial doctrines '" against family
income splitting.
An analysis of the Commission's specific proposals for the in-
clusion of dependent children within the context of the full Report
is now in order. First, the proposal that gifts and bequests from a
person outside the tax unit constitute income to the recipient unit
may mean that such gifts will be discouraged. Unless the gift is
deposited in the Income Adjustment Account by the child," it com-
prises income to the family, and will likely raise the family's rate and
then be taxed at that rate. This disincentive is in addition to the
inevitable disincentive to any giving caused by treating gifts and
bequests as incomeY7 Treating gifts as income also means potential
difficulty for the child leaving the unit. Any property received from
his parents subsequent to leaving constitutes income to him. Thus,
so long as he is young enough to remain in his parents' unit, he must
weigh the tax benefits of avoiding inclusion of his income with the
family's against the detriment of having to pay taxes (after he leaves)
on property received from his parents either while he was a member
of the unit or at the time he leaves.
172 E.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 641-83 (trusts), 704(e) (family partnerships).
173E.g, the rubrics "anticipatory assignment," "beneficial enjoyment," "control,"
and "fruit and tree" where used in a family setting.
A possible constitutional problem should be mentioned. The Supreme Court in
1931 held that a Wisconsin statute aggregating the income of husband, wife and de-
pendent children under 18 years of age and applying a progressive income tax rate
schedule to the total violated due process. Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court,
said that "any attempt . . . to measure the tax on one person's property or income
by reference to the property or income of another is contrary to due process .... "
Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n of Wis., 284 U.S. 206, 215 (1931). Justices Holmes, Brandeis
and Stone dissented. Since that time, however, courts in the United States have moved
away from the "technical tests of local property laws," GRoVES, supra note 1, at 62,
and have sustained other joint-return statutes. See, e.g., Ballester v. Court of Tax
Appeals, 61 P.R.R. 460 (1943), aff'd mub iwm. Ballester-Ripoll v. Court of Tax Ap-
peals, 142 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 723 (1944) ; Albanese
D'Imperio v. Secretary of the Treasury, 76 P.R.R. 302 (1954), aff'd 223 F.2d 413
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 874 (1955). It is to be expected that federal legisla-
tion taxing families as a unit would be held constitutional. See generally R. MAGLL,
TAXABLE INCoE 329-34 (Rev. ed. 1945) (qualifying this conclusion as being "likely"
where the tax liability is apportioned to family members) ; D. THoRsox, SELECTION OF
A TAx UNIT 82-108.
174 The child's Account is different from the Account available to adult taxpayers,
the latter being designed as an income-averaging provision which does not earn interest.
See 3 REPoRT 259-60, 269-73, 278-79.
175 Of course, increasing the family's rate in turn increases the possibility of dis-
incentives to work.
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Second, the Commission proposes a number of provisions to
ameliorate the harsher effects of inclusion. One is a $500 exemption
for a child's earned income. This is a strong counter to disincentive.
Another provision is for an education credit, which counters the argu-
ment that inclusion will discourage education. 70
Finally, the Commission proposes an Account into which income
earned by a child in excess of $500 and gifts from outside the family
can be deposited. Amounts so deposited constitute income only upon
their withdrawal from the Account, which can occur no later than
the child's withdrawal from the unit. 7 The child's Account is a
qualification on inclusion of children and an acknowledgment of their
transient membership in the family unit. The Commission believes
that without the Account these sums would be taxed first to the family
and later to the child upon leaving the family unit. The Account thus
acts to preserve incentive for a child to work and for donors outside
the family to make gifts to children by effectuating a pass-through
which avoids the double tax. The Account is treated below in detail.' 8
The Commission's standards for termination of a child's member-
ship in the family unit are reasonable. With the exception of the
provision for opting out, the termination events are automatic, and
none are necessarily coincidental with the child's actual departure.
However, most of them will be coincidental, and when combined with
the administrative ease of automatic cutoffs, the Commission's choice
of termination events seems appropriate.
A problem does exist, however, with married students. Treating
gifts and bequests as income means that parental gifts for support and
education made subsequent to the child's marriage 17 are taxed to the
child. 80  Married students often continue-financially, at least-as
members of their original families. One solution would be to permit
bona fide, full time students to postpone formation of their own unit
until they complete their full time education. A problem still would
remain, however-how to treat the couple vis-A-vis their original
families. The couple could be placed in the husband's (or wife's)
176 3 REPORT 229-33. The proposed credit for expenses incurred for post-secondary
education is an amount equal to one fourth of the "fees" paid, allowed to the unit of
which the student is a member, plus an annual credit to the student's unit of up to
$300 for living costs if he is not a dependent child. Unused credits could be carried
forward.
3.77 Id. at 136.
178 See text accompanying notes 243-63 infra.
179 The education credit, note 172 spra, is not relevant at this juncture because
(1) it is designed to encourage education, not to mitigate the harshness and conceptual
inappropriateness of the deemed withdrawal, and (2) it does not change the result of
income flows between two separate units but constitutes relief only for the paying
unit. Similarly, the credit for support payments for once-dependent children provides
relief only to the paying unit. See note 19 mtpra.
180 Such additional taxation would presumably create strong pressure on young
students to avoid marriage, as those who could count on continued parental support
would be able to avoid taxes on these payments until they reached the age of 25.
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original family or each spouse could remain in his original unit.
Optional filing with the respective original family units seems the
more appropriate of the two solutions. Such a provision would, how-
ever, pose several problems. First, it would be necessary for both sets
of parents to consent to the election. Where the student husband's
family, for example, is supplying a portion of his wife's expenses, her
family may be unwilling or unable to assume responsibility for taxes
attributable to the inclusion in their income of these payments to their
daughter. Also, it would not be easy to apportion payments to the
student couple between husband and wife. Moreover, it is by no means
clear how long a student couple should be permitted to put off forming
a new unit. While a requirement that both husband and wife be full-
time students seems reasonable, it is also arguable that a couple should
continue to qualify if the wife leaves school to raise a family.
A simpler approach for married students would be to provide their
unit with an exemption for financial assistance received from either
parental unit for educational and support purposes. While tuition will
vary from school to school, a maximum support allowance could be
fixed, and the exemption limited to the amount by which the couple's
tuition and support expenses exceed their income from sources other
than their parents. Husband and wife would still be deemed to have
withdrawn from their original family units, thus preserving the con-
ceptual integrity of withdrawal, and thereby eliminating the problem
of determining when to deem withdrawal to have taken place if
marriage is not to be the measuring event. Additionally, the ex-
emption would alleviate the administrative difficulties of apportioning
to husband and wife sums received by the couple from their parents.
Despite its departure from the neatness of the Commission's "compre-
hensive tax base," the exemption seems the more appropriate means
of accommodating the economic realities of married students.
The Commission's recommendation that the family unit not ex-
tend beyond husband, wife and dependent children is sensible. From
some statistics gathered for the University of Michigan, it appears that
the number of relatives 181 living with the immediate family has de-
creased as living standards in the United States have risen, so that
only 17 per cent of family heads provide housing for relatives. These
17 per cent average 1.4 relatives each. The average cost to each
family is a net of $492 a year for food and housing.8 2 Almost no one
with an income of $5,000 or more lives in a relative's house. Families
with annual incomes of less than $1,000 or over $15,000 seldom take
in relatives.
188
181 "Relative," as here used, excludes spouses and children.
182 MORGAN 173-79.
183 Id. at 163, 170.
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On the "entity" analysis, a close relative (for example, an elderly
parent) living with a family may in fact share whatever income he
has, but he is often more of a boarder than an integral part of the family.
Inclusion in the context of the Commission's intrafamily transfer tax
immunity would be most attractive to persons, relatives or not, who
intended to make gifts or bequests to members of another unit.'"4 On
the other hand, neither a close relative nor the family would want to
incur the potentially greater tax burden attendant upon income aggre-
gation. It would be administratively impossible to make distinctions
on the basis of whether the close relative, or perhaps a friendly
stranger, is in fact sufficiently a member of the family to justify
inclusion.
Allocation of the Income Tax Burden
A threshold question in allocating the income tax burden among
various units is the relevance of family responsibilities.'85 The Report
is bottomed on taxation in accord with "ability to pay," and it might
be anticipated that this standard makes family responsibilities relevant.
It is arguable, however, that the choices people make respecting mar-
riage and family size are irrelevant to "ability to pay" and that the
general expenses of family responsibilities represent the exercise of "dis-
cretionary economic power," rendering them consumption choices.'8 6
Thus a bachelor and a married man have merely chosen to spend their
money in different ways, and, such being the case, their choices are
irrelevant to tax burdens.
The Commission appropriately rejects this "strange" 187 argument
and treats expenses arising from family responsibilities-as well as
savings attributable to family groupings-as relevant to tax allocation.
A wife and children are not easily regarded as mere consumption
choices. And as a matter of social policy, the notion is well-entrenched
that taxation should be neutral respecting marriage and children.8 8
184 The adequacy of the credit for support of a close relative would also affect the
attitude of the relative and family. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
1S5 The idea of making allowance for the fact that persons of equal income may
have different responsibilities was of later origin than the income tax itself and is said
to have been an "outgrowth of the rising sense of social responsibility and concern for
the individual member of the state." P. STRAYER, THE TAXATION OF SMALL INCOMES
44 (1930).
186 Professor Bittker suggests that a "comprehensive tax base" implies that family
expenses are indeed irrelevant. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of
Income Tax Reform, 80 HARv. L. REv. 925, 941 (1967).
18 7 Thorson, Tax Treatment of Family Income 122; ef. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL
TAx POLIcY 50 (1966).
188 Oldman & Temple 602:
There may be social policies which should be implemented by a government
through its tax system, or other quasi-compulsory devices, but decisions as to
marriage and children should be left to the widest range of individual choice
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Unless allowances are made for necessary costs arising from mar-
riage and having children, the system cannot be neutral, i.e., there will
be a tax cost, a disincentive.
8 9
The second question preliminary to allocation is one of general
goals. It has been noted that
The formulation of universally applicable principles to
guide in the allocation of tax burdens will be a difficult task
until a rational theory of progressive taxation is developed
and demonstrated. Even then, it is likely that the basic
decisions in the application of progressive taxation will con-
tinue to involve value judgments of a character that only the
electorate can make.:90
The Commission subscribes to the central objective of equity, vertical
and horizontal, as expressed in the standards of "ability to pay" and
"discretionary economic power." The Internal Revenue Code's rate
structure, meanwhile, is said to reflect a public policy choice made
during the depression to redistribute income in order to increase ag-
gregate spending and to attack the economic power of high income
groups. 9' Thus equity, while a principal objective of allocation, is
by no means the only possible one. Further, equity is not simply
defined. The Commission certainly does an impressive job of solving
the definitional problems, with its standard of "discretionary economic
power," but it is finally compelled to conclude that, "In a democracy,
equity questions ultimately must be resolved in terms of the shared
values of the people." 192
that is consistent with the moris and with the economic and sociological needs
of a given society.
See Atlas, supra note 127, at 530; Pechman, supra note 103, at 481; Thorson, Tax
Treatment of Family Income 129-30.
189 Apart from the consensus for neutrality, it is widely believed that, within
limits, the tax treatment of the family cannot have any actual effect on decisions people
make about marriage and having children. Oldman & Temple 602; cf. GROVES, mipra
note 1, at 76; P. TAYLOR, THE EcoNomics OF PurLIc FxNAcE 402 (1948). See also
BRITISH ROYAL CommIssioN OF THE TAXATION OF PROFITS AND INCOME, Second Re-
port, 1 118, at 36 (1954):
[T]he reasons that impel men and women to prefer marriage to more casual
associations are many and powerful and . . . the present treatment of the
income of married couples for the purpose of tax is not more likely to lead
people away from matrimony than tempt them into it.
But cf. SH poT 53 (suggesting that complete exemption of interspousal transfers might
stimulate more marriages between persons in different generations); Thorson, Tax
Treatment of Family Icome 129 (noting that economic factors may be crucial in
"family planning" and are of "secondary importance" in other marriage decisions such
as those concerning "marital adjustment and divorce").
190 0ldman & Temple 603.
191 Magill, Federal Income Tax Revision, 1 TAX RmVsION COMPENDIUm 87-88
(1959).
192 3 REPORT 5.
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The Commission's specific yardsticks for allocation, for the most
part, seem to be quite reasonable and in accord with the views of
economists and tax critics. 93  One problem, discussed above in the
context of undue disincentive to a wife's working,'9" is the failure to
distinguish between one- and two-job families. Failure to draw such a
distinction penalizes the working wife and constitutes a departure from
the discretionary economic power standard, from equity as defined by
the Commission, and from neutral treatment of marriage.
A second problem exists in measuring the degrees of various
distinctions. The Commission admits that "judgments" are neces-
sary,195 primarily because of the lack of sufficient statistical, com-
parative data and because of the unreliability of such data as is avail-
able. Unquestionably, there is a shortage of information on, for
example, the expenses and economies of marriage. 96 What is available
is often met with skepticism. 97 Complete and reliable data are pre-
requisites to making the subtle differentiations proposed by the
Commission.
Turning to implementation of goals, the Commission proposes
separate rate schedules for single persons and married couples. Sep-
arate rate schedules are "an especially flexible instrument," and
permit "an almost infinite number of compromises." "9 Even though
difficult to construct,'99 their theoretical capacity to differentiate mar-
ried couples from singles is clear."' ° A secondary advantage of their
use is that by eliminating exemptions, rates can be reduced, with
attendant psychological benefits.' Two criticisms can be made of their
use. One is that it is difficult to change them later relative to one
another,202 since, presumably, the basic data would have to be re-
evaluated. For this reason, Joseph A. Pechman recommends use of
a single schedule coupled with adjustments through credits or, prefer-
193 See, e.g., Oldman & Temple 603-04; Sander, supra note 160, at 20.
194 See text accompanying notes 156-60 supra.
195 3 REPORT 7, 167.
19B See, e.g., GRovEs, supra note 1, at 105-06; E. MocKm, supra note 72 at 110;
Pechman, supra note 103, at 479.
IV7 See, e.g., Fortune, Dec., 1967, at 98 (a section entitled "Shadowy Statistics"
ridicules the recent "City Worker's Family Budget" published by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics of the United States Department of Labor).
198 GRovEs, supra note 1, at 77. Accord, Oldman & Temple 604.
199 Pechman, supra note 103, at 479-80.
200 The idea of separate rate schedules is not new. See GRovEs, supra note 1, at
22 (respecting their use internationally); W. ViCKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION 274-87 (1947) ; Pechman, supra note 103, at 473-86.
201 Seltzer, supra note 120, at 510.
2 0 2 Remarks of Joseph A. Pechman, in CANADIAN TAX FOUNDATION 443.
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ably, varying deductions. The deductions would vary with family
income and the number of family members. The adjustments would
be designed to accommodate the needed differentiation. °3 It is also
arguable that separate schedules are vulnerable to political forces seek-
ing to make disproportionate adjustments, quite likely to the dis-
advantage of singles (as happened in the United States with the split-
income rates granted married couples in 1948). While these criticisms
may have some validity, it is not clear that a single schedule, or any
solution, can solve the problems. The Commission recommends as a
means of making short-term adjustments that the tax liability of each
individual be multiplied by a factor chosen to increase or decrease each
taxpayer's liability by the same percentage amount, 04 e.g., a ten per
cent surcharge on tax liability computed under the rate structure exist-
ing at the time.
In addition to dual rate schedules, the Commission recommends
use of credits rather than exemptions. The value of a fixed credit does
not rise with income; the value of a fixed exemption does, in proportion
to the taxpayer's marginal rate. The Commission acknowledges that
the expenses of raising children-and by implication other "non-
discretionary expenses"-increase with income, though not as rapidly
as the marginal rates of tax increase with incomeY 5 The Commission
also admits that the proposed credits are not adequate, at least in the
case of dependent children. °
Thus the Commission moves away from the subtle, precise adjust-
ments it recommends through the dual rate schedules for differentiation
of singles and couples. The proposed credits also constitute a departure
from the "discretionary economic power" and "equity" goals: in
absolute terms the credits are inadequate at all levels, and in relative
terms they discriminate in favor of low income families. The impact
is hardest on large, low-to-moderate income families for whom the
inadequacies of the credits would be compounded (by the number of
children) and would be most disruptive to meeting non-discretionary
expenses.
To consider alternatives to credits is to raise a whole spectrum of
questions relating to the philosophy of progressive taxation, forms and
rationales of exemptions, administrability, revenue needs, and so
forth. However, given the Commission's goal of taxing on the basis
of "discretionary economic power" as measured by sophisticated
statistical data, one proposition is particularly worthy of consideration:
203 Id. An extensive study of the forms and rationales of the various credits and
exemptions is beyond the scope of this Comment.
20413 REP oRT 197.
2 05 1d. at 17.
20 Id. at 181.
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use of more sophisticated rate schedules based on comprehensive data
as to the "discretionary economic power" of various tax units. Size
of families, ages of members, total income, various non-discretionary
expenses (as those of a working wife), and cost of living differences
between geographical regions and types of communities could theo-
retically be built into the schedules.10 7 If the data could be collected-
and admittedly this might be difficult and costly-the Commission's
"discretionary economic power" standard could be fully effectuated.
To administer the application of such complex criteria, publication of
complicated schedules might be possible. Or, in this computerized
era, it would seem possible for the government, at reasonable cost, to
figure the taxpayer's liability on the basis of specified information re-
ported by the taxpayer at the end of his tax year. However, this
technique, in its lack of openness, could well prove unpopular, and thus
the degree of sophistication of rate schedules could appropriately be
limited to a level found manageable by the average taxpayer. The
Commission's view is that more sophisticated rate schedules are not
administratively feasible.0 ' This is debatable. 9
Before considering the resultant burdens under the proposed rate
schedules, two warnings are in order. First, the Commission is care-
ful to stress that its allocation is made with a view to other taxes in
Canada. For example, it believes that, due to the regressivity of other
forms of taxation, the income tax must be progressive merely to
achieve a proportional tax system and markedly progressive to obtain
a progressive tax system. 10 Therefore, the schedules cannot be fully
evaluated without the context of the entire Canadian system. Second,
the Commission has not attempted "to present an 'ideal' set of rates,
but rather to achieve a suitable progression within the rate
schedules." 21 For this reason, the schedules can be considered only
in terms of relative, not absolute, burdens.
The table below indicates the proposed burdens of single persons
vis-A-vis married couples with the same total income. It should be
noted that, due to the use of credits rather than deductions, "taxable
income" is very nearly equal to total income received.2 12
207 Data as a basis for adjustments for the latter two factors can be acquired by
studies similar to the recent U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTIcs, DEP'T OF LABOR, Crr
WoRKEz's FAmmY BuDGEr FOR A MODERATE LmIG STANDARD (1966).
208 3 REPORT 179.
209 The Commission merely makes the assertion of infeasibility, without explana-
tion or, apparently, examination.
210 3 REPORT 153.
2113 REPORT 197.
2 1 2 However, taxable income would not include (for example) amounts paid into
qualifying "retirement income plans," id. at 301, or into the child's Account, .npra
note 53 and accompanying text, or certain gifts in kind, supra note 56.
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PROPOSED RATES 
213
Taxable Income
Less than $1,000
1,500
2,100
3,500
5,000
7,000
10,000
12,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
40,000
70,000
100,000
200,000
Singl
6(
152
405
725
1,195
1,955
2,51!
3,415
5,015
6,76!
12,515
25,715
40,315
90,31!
Tax Liability
e Couple
0
0
0
197
457
847
1,467
1,907
2,627
3,977
5,527
11,077
24,277
38,677
88,677
Reductions of Tax for
Single Man Upon
Marriage to Woman With
No Income
Amount Percentage
$60 100%
152 100%
208 51%
268 37%
348 29%
488 25%
608 24%
788 23%
1,038 21%
1,238 18%
1,438 11%
1,438 6%
1,638 4%
1,638 2%
These rates seem to follow the Commission's belief that at low incomes
there are diseconomies to marriage and that at high incomes economies
are insubstantial. Hence, little account is taken of marriage at the
$25,000 level and almost none at $70,000 and Up214
One criticism potentially to be levelled at the schedules is Pech-
man's contention that, despite their availability to couples with and
without children, they take account of expenses for dependent chil-
dren.2 115 If the schedules are so constructed-and it is unclear whether
or not they are-then childless couples receive undue relief.2 6  Also,
it should be noticed that the family schedule is quite generous to certain
persons who qualify for it, notably surviving, divorced or separated
parents with a dependent child, unwed persons with an adopted child,
and a unit consisting of two "dependent" children whose parents are
deceased or resident outside the country.
213 Adapted from 3 REPORT 170 (table 11-4), 174 (table 11-6), 175 (table 11-7).
214 A $25,000 "cut-off" point for economies of marriage was suggested by Professor
John W. Ervin in 1947. Ervin, Federal Taxes and the Family, 20 S. CAL. L. Rxv.
243,256 (1947).
215 Pechman, supra note 202, at 443.
215 The Commission may assume (a) that most couples have dependent children
for many of their married years and (b) that it is more advantageous, perhaps for
welfare policy purposes, to provide additional relief for children through manipulation
of the rates in favor of lower income families than through increasing the dependent
child credit, the benefit of which could not be limited to low income families.
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Tax Consequences of Property Transfers Within and
Without the Family Unit
Placing intrafamily property transfers outside the purview of a
tax system is a logical, albeit not a compelled, corollary of the choice
of the family unit for income tax purposes. For if the family is a
social and financial entity, sharing and acting as one, it is logical that
transfers of what is, in effect, common property do not rise to the
level of taxable events. 17 Beyond this simple logic, however, one
must confront the philosophy of transfer taxes, the Commission's
recommendation that all transfers by gift or bequest recognized under
its proposals be treated as income to the recipient, and the policy of
recognizing gains and losses on sales.
There is no clear consensus as to the precise goals of transfer
taxation. Certainly one is taxing property once a generation.2 1 3
Another is reducing the concentration of wealth." A third is taxing
windfalls as a special type of "ability to pay" attendant upon a gift
or bequest."2 And a fourth, sometimes cited, is encouraging inter
viros, gifts, especially to younger generations, by diminishing any
incentive to hold property until death."2
The Commission proposes that, as a rule, permanent, gratuitous
transfers of property be treated as income to the recipient." 2 Such
transfers are depicted as increasing the recipient's economic power in
the same way as wages, dividends, interest and property gains and
thus as appropriately included in the "comprehensive tax base." 223
As a rule, gains on the exchange of property are recognized as
income under both the Internal Revenue Code224 and the Report.
2 2 5
Losses are also recognized under the Commission's proposed "compre-
hensive tax base." " The Code provides in general for recognition
of losses on sales, though denying recognition in certain transactions
between related taxpayers.
217 Conversely, it is arguable that the appropriateness of intrafamily transfer
immunity suggests that the family should be the basic unit for tax purposes.
218 See, e.g., SHOUP 100, 119; G. WHATcRoFr, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION-
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 121 (1965); DeWind, The Approaching Crisis in Federal
Estate and Gift Taxation, 38 CALIF. L. Rxv. 79, 110 (1950).
219 See, e.g., SHOUP 100-19; Lowndes, A Practical Program for Reforming the
Federal Estate Tax, 5 VILL. L. REv. 1, 3 (1959) ; Rudick, What Alternative to the
Estate and Gift Taxes?, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 150, 158 (1950).
220 See, e.g., SHOUP 110, 119.
221 See, e.g., SHoUP 120.
222 The merits of treating gifts and bequests as income are beyond the scope of
this Comment. It has been suggested that this proposal will engender more contro-
versy than any other aspect of the Report. Goodman, supra note 4, at 373.
233 REPORT 465. Gifts are exempt, however, to the extent of a $250 annual and
$5000 lifetime exclusion. Id. at 478.2 2 4 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1002.
2 2 5 See 3 REPORT 39-42.
226 3 REPORT 39-42.
227 INT. Rxv. CODE oF 1954, § 267, disallows deductions on losses from sales or
exchanges of property between family members, defined as brothers, sisters, spouse,
ancestors and lineal descendants.
[Vo1.117:98
TAX TREATMENT OF THE FAMILY
1. Interspousal Immunity
Viewed from each of the above perspectives, the case for removal
of interspousal transactions from the purview of a tax system is im-
pressive. In terms of the traditional philosophy of transfer taxation,
there is only the slightest reason to treat interspousal gifts and be-
quests as taxable events. Given the economic and social unity of
husband and wife, no windfall or special ability to pay arises. And,
insofar as a gift or bequest is merely a transfer of title between spouses,
not changing the wealth of the unit, it hardly seems to rise to the
level of a taxable event justifying imposition of a tax simply to reduce
the concentration of wealth. In addition, the policy of taxing property
once a generation is not thwarted by immunity, except in the relatively
rare situation where husband and wife are of different generations."
With respect to encouraging inter vivos giving, especially to
younger generations, it may be expected that interspousal immunity
will lead to greater fluidity of legal ownership between husband and
wife and will in some cases induce the bequest of a greater portion
of an estate to the surviving spouse."' These tendencies would delay
the passing of property to others, including persons of a younger
generation. However, in a transfer tax system imposing graduated
tax rates on estates, interspousal immunity does not alter the fact that
the splitting of bequests by husband and wife in their respective estates
minimizes their total estate tax liability. Under either interspousal
immunity or the present Code provisions, notably section 2056's
marital deduction, husband and wife can minimize the estate tax in
passing property to the children if the first to die leaves half his
estate to the children and half to the survivor, who passes it on to the
children at death.2 3 ° In short, interspousal immunity does not neces-
sarily encourage a husband to leave a greater portion of his estate to
the wife. On balance, therefore, it is doubtful that interspousal im-
munity seriously threatens the policy of encouraging inter vivos giving,
especially to younger generations.
In the context of the Commission's proposal that gifts and be-
quests constitute elements of the "comprehensive tax base," inter-
spousal immunity is virtually compelled. Their net economic resources
remaining constant, it strains the imagination to conceive of such an
interspousal transfer being reported by husband and wife as income.
Furthermore, the hardships allegedly brought about by taxing inter-
228 The possibility that husband and wife may be of different generations has led
to the suggestion that non-recognition be withdrawn if their ages differ by 20 years
or more. Rudick, =pra note 219, at 178.
229 Saoup 53.
2 30 See id. at 54-57.
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spousal transfers2'1 would be compounded by increasing the tax burden,
as treating the transfers as income would presumably do."'
An analysis of the transfer tax philosophy against a background
of treating gifts and bequests as income reveals perhaps less difficulty
with interspousal immunity than when such treatment is considered
in the traditional transfer tax context. Reduction of the concentration
of wealth is facilitated by the expected higher tax burden on recognized
transfers and by the incentive to distribute gifts among several re-
cipients (especially persons with low incomes) in order to reduce the
total tax burden on the transfers. This renders less significant the
r6le of the double tax on a couple's property. On the other hand, this
same phenomenon counters the policy of encouraging inter vivos gifts
because the greater tax burden on transfers to persons other than the
spouse (and children, if they also are entitled to immunity) is an
incentive for a husband to parcel out some gifts himself and then to
leave property to the wife who can continue to parcel out their property
over the years so as to spread out the receipt of income by the desired
donees.
2 3
The Report's proposal not to recognize sales between spouses is
reasonable, given the unity of husband and wife 234-together they gain
nothing on a sale, nor do they suffer a loss. By comparison, under the
present Code's treatment of sales, recognition of gain generally entails
a step-up in basis and immunity to a gift tax. In part, lack of recog-
nition is compelled by the Commission's interspousal immunity for
gifts and bequests, because even if sales were to be recognized husband
and wife could merely cast the transaction in the form of two separate,
tax-free gifts. Furthermore, if such sales were recognized, there would
still be no gift tax to induce the reporting of a sale, although in some
circumstances there might be incentive to report a sale so as to step-up
the basis of property for depreciation purposes.
In sum, the case for removing interspousal transfers from the
purview of a tax system is strong. As the Commission argues, husband
31 See, e.g., 1 RPORT 18-19; DeWind, suprs note 218, at 110.
232 A third framework for analysis of interspousal immunity, and a hybrid of the
present Code scheme and the Commission's income treatment, is that of an accessions
tax system. This tax, as formulated by Professor William D. Andrews' Proposal in
the American Law Institute Federal Estate and Gift Tax Project, Study Draft No. 2,
Nov. 14, 1966,
is an excise tax on the transfer of property by gift or on death, but imposed
on the recipient rather than the donor or the decedents estate. Like a transfer
tax, the accessions tax would have a graduated rate schedule; but the rate is
graduated according to the aggregate taxable accessions of the recipient from
all sources, without regard to other property owned or disposed of by the
donor or decedent.
Andrews, supra note 139, at 589.
=3 This incentive to parcel gifts does not exist under an accessions tax system
because gifts are aggregated over the years and a rate schedule based on that total is
applied. See id.
2
3
4 See Pechman, supra note 202, at 443.
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and wife tend to act as one and to treat the property involved as their
property. Horizontal inequities stemming from the order of their
deaths, the pattern of gifts between them, and, under the Code, state-
determined property rights are thereby eliminated,8 5 as is the con-
ceptual difficulty and economic harshness of a double tax on their
property. Certainly administrative and enforcement problems are
eliminated. Families of moderate or little wealth who find it necessary
to pass all their property to the surviving spouse regardless of tax
considerations also benefit. 36 In the context of the Commission's
choice of the family as the income tax unit and the treatment of gifts
and bequests as income, with income defined in terms of the unit,
immunity is virtually compelled. In the context of the Code's transfer
tax policy, immunity is less compelling because of the substantial loss
of revenue that would be entailed. Under the Report this prospect is
not as serious because of the anticipated revenues from other sources.
Under the Code immunity would require new sources of revenue.23
One troubling exception to the Commission's proposal for com-
plete interspousal immunity should be mentioned. The Commission
proposes that until a couple has a natural-born child, or until the
marriage has lasted for five years, tax-free transfers to the other spouse
may be made only in an amount up to one-half the income reported by
the unit each year. The Commission believes the limitation is "neces-
sary to reduce tax avoidance through artificially arranged mar-
riages." 23 One commentator has observed:
Personally, I find it too difficult to accept the notion that
a man and a woman would enter wedlock on the same
grounds that two corporations would amalgamate, in search
of a tax-free reorganization." 9
With respect to the natural-born child limitation, another com-
mentator suggests that it is rather unrealistic to expect that a couple
would go to the trouble of adopting a child so as to qualify for tax-free
transfers.2 4' Especially in the context of the Report, with recognized
gifts and bequests treated as income and the recognition of appreciation
on the transferred property as income to the transferor, the limitation
seems ill-advised.
235 See text accompanying note 71 supra.
2-3 6 See SHouP 121; Alexander, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation: The Major
Issues Presented in the American Law Institute Project, 22 TAx L. REv. 635, 683
(1967).2 3 SHoup 53; cf. Alexander, supra, note 236, at 683.
23 3 REPoRT 127.
2,39 Remarks of Marshall A. Cohen, in CANADIA" TAX FOuNDATION 257. See
Casner, supra note 139, at 556-57 (outlining an American Law Institute Draft Pro-
posal that would grant immunity without limitation to interspousal transfers; in fact,
certain transfers would qualify even though transferor and transferee were not married
at the time of the transfer, e.g., where the marriage is subsequently annulled).
240 Cohen, supra note 239, at 258.
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To avoid the inequities of the proposed limitation and still re-
stict the hypothetical, artificially arranged marriage, surely a more
reasonable approach can be found. One would be to withdraw the
immunity retroactively in cases of "marriage in contemplation of
death" and other presumptively mala fide situations where the marriage
ends by death or divorce within one year of its creation. For tax
purposes, a presumption in these situations could lie against the
validity of the marriage, thereby shifting to the taxpayer the burden
of proving that the marriage was bona fide.24'
2. Immunity for Dependent Children
The Commission's proposal that intrafamily transfer immunity
extend to dependent children is more troublesome. The Commission
proposes deferring recognition of parental transfers to children until
the child's departure from the family unit, not permanent immunity.
With respect to the philosophy of transfer taxation, the merits of im-
munity for children are about the same as for interspousal transfers.
Given the family's unity, gifts and bequests do not amount to wind-
falls. Further, inter vivos giving to one's children would be en-
couraged, though perhaps only on a short-term basis, depending upon
how the child's withdrawal from the family is treated. If at with-
drawal the gifts are taken by the child and a graduated tax applied,
be it a transfer or income tax, a bunching effect and higher total tax
burden would result. Thus there would be a substantial incentive to
make permanent, non-consumed gifts to a child only after his with-
drawal in order to spread out the receipts and thereby minimize the tax
burden. One result might be a greater tendency for one spouse to
leave his estate principally to the other who could then continue to
parcel out gifts to once-dependent children.' On the other hand,
it can be argued that transfers to children young enough to qualify
as dependents are not the kind of socially useful transfers envisioned
by the policy, inasmuch as such children are in general unable to make
any significant use of the property.
Property is taxed once a generation by providing for its taxation
at the child's withdrawal. And the policy against concentration of
wealth is likewise implemented by taxing at withdrawal. In fact, this
policy is implemented more by taxing at withdrawal after initial im-
munity than by taxing initially, since under the former approach the
value of the gift or bequest at recognition includes appreciation on
the property. However, account must be taken of the parcelling
phenomenon (which reduces the tax on the property, although pre-
sumably it decreases the concentration of wealth) and the fact that
241 This is the basic approach of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035.
M See note 229 supra and accompanying text.
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even if there is no parcelling there is deferment of taxes from the time
of the initial transfer to recognition at withdrawal.
As in the case of interspousal transfers, immunity for transfers to
dependent children is virtually compelled by the Commission's analysis
of the unity of the family coupled with measurement of a unit's income
by their aggregate incomes including recognized gifts and bequests.
Assessing the transfer tax philosophy within the context of the
Commission's proposal that recognized gifts and bequests give rise to
income to the recipient (market value) as well as income to the trans-
feror (to the extent of appreciation), contradictory implications for
immunity are encountered. Presumably, the Commission's total tax
at withdrawal on property taken by the child will be larger than a
transfer tax imposed only on the parents (this of course depends upon
the rate schedules involved, exemptions, and, in the context of the
Report, income averaging provisions for both parent and withdrawn
child). Thus, assuming the Report's treatment of withdrawal gives
rise to the greater tax, reduction of concentrations of wealth occurs to
a greater extent under immunity coupled with recognition of income
(to parents and child) than under immunity coupled with a transfer
tax (on the parents alone). Countering this result is the probability
that the greater tax burden in the former situation increases the in-
centive for parents not to make permanent gifts to children until after
their withdrawal from the family.
As in the case of interspousal sales, non-recognition of sales be-
tween parent and child is sensible on the "entity" analysis and a
logical corollary of immunity for gratuitous transfers. However,
unlike interspousal sales, parent-child sales, for whatever reason made,
must ultimately be reckoned with at the child's withdrawal.
3. Tax Consequences Surrounding the Child's Withdrawal
If no transfers of property between parent and dependent child are
to be recognized as income, troublesome problems will attend the child's
coming of age and withdrawal from the family. Property taken by the
child at withdrawal can derive from three sources: his own labors,
gratuitous transfers from his parents, or gratuitous transfers from
persons outside the family. Given the child's transient membership in
the family, there arises the question of when and how to tax these flows.
Products of the departing child's labors may be recognized as they
are acquired, when the departing child takes them from the unit, or
at both times. Further, his gratuitous receipts from outside the
family can be recognized at their transfer to him, at his withdrawal,
or at both events. And regardless of when each of the various flows
is recognized, under an income or traditional transfer tax approach,
the problem arises of measuring their respective amounts.
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The Internal Revenue Code's treatment of these problems turns
on the transfer of title to property. A child reports his income and
generally receives legal title thereto. Gifts and bequests, whether from
parents or outsiders, are taxed to the transferor at the time of transfer,
and the child takes title. Thus there is no question of withdrawal in
itself being a taxable event: title to property controls, the tax cost
for title having been previously paid in the form of the possibility of a
tax at the time of acquisition.
The Commission's treatment of the child's withdrawal centers on
the child's "Income Adjustment Account" into which a child's earned
income (in excess of $500 annually) and outside gifts may be deposited.
The amounts deposited are in effect excluded from the family income.
At the child's withdrawal, all property he takes with him is deemed a
gift from the family, subject to $5,000 lifetime and $250 annual gift
exemptions. Coincidentally with withdrawal, he must take the de-
posited sums from the Account and treat them as income." Liberal
income averaging provisions are available to the withdrawing child in
order to mitigate the tax impact of recognizing potentially large sums
as income. He may deposit the money in a non-interest bearing
Account similar to the child's Account, thereby excluding it from
income until removed therefrom.' The professed objective of the
child's Account is to avoid a double tax on the eligible amounts, first to
the family and then to the child at his departure from the family, by
effectuating a pass-through. 45 However, the Commission severely
restricts implementation of the pass-through principle. Unless the
deposit is made, the child's earnings and outside gifts, if in fact subse-
quently taken from the family by the child, are taxed twice, first as
income to the family and second as an effective gift from parent to
child at his departure.
The child's Account in itself is not without conceptual and prac-
tical difficulties. First, non-recognition of deposited sums constitutes
a departure from the Commission's "discretionary economic power"
standard-the family has the power to decide whether or not to
deposit the gift or earnings, giving the family initial control of the
property. Second, the deposit can be withdrawn at any time,24 6
making the deposit as much an asset of the family as a savings account
(complete with "a modest rate" of interest '7).
A second major difficulty with the Account is one of vertical
equity: the Account would be of benefit mainly to middle and upper
243 See note 57 spra and accompanying text.
244 3 REPORT 261-81.
245 3 REPORT 135-36; see text accompanying note 57 stpra.
246 3 REPORT 136.
247 Id. at 273. Account deposits would not, however, be assignable. Id. at 260.
Interest would be paid only upon withdrawal, id. at 136, but it would be possible to
withdraw each year an amount equal to the accrued interest.
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income families. Not only can lower income families generally least
afford to divert funds from current consumption needs or make
significant gifts to children leaving the family unit, but there is also
little incentive for them to make deposits since their tax rates are low
in any case. Further, children in high income families probably receive
the bulk of eligible gifts and earnings through grandfather trusts, better
access to higher paying jobs, etc., and would be more inclined to make
all eligible deposits in order both to defer taxes on those amounts and
to preserve the possibility of their pass-through.' Finally, outside
donors would have an incentive to make a gift to the child instead of
to the parents in order to permit the family to increase the amount of
the child's subsequent immunity by depositing the gift. 49 If the family
later needs the funds, they can always be withdrawn from the Account.
And if the family cannot afford to let the child take the deposited
funds upon his departure, they can be withdrawn by the child and
turned over to the family just prior to his departure. Use of the fund
therefore promises to negate much of the effect of inclusion of de-
pendent children for upper income families and to shift additional tax
burden onto families unable to take advantage of the Account."'
Another serious drawback of the Account is its restrictive effect
on investment, appreciation and gifts in kind. Assets deposited cannot
be invested or expected to appreciate significantly in value with a
potentially deterimental impact on the investment sector of the
economy. Gifts in kind cannot be deposited, although "the monetary
value thereof" can be.25' If a family does not have sufficient cash or
borrowing power, the gift in kind will have to be recognized or
liquidated and the proceeds deposited, reducing a prospective donor's
incentive to give to dependent children.
To circumvent these restrictions, the donor can look to the
trust. 52  There he finds only partial solace. The Commission pro-
poses that transfers in trust, except those for the benefit of members
of the settlor's family unit, be taxed initially as income to the trust
at the top personal rate of 50 per cent."5  There are two exceptions to
248 These families could use the Account in lieu of bank savings.
249 This phenomenon occurs under the Code also, but is limited by the fact that if
the parents later want the gift for themselves another transfer tax arises.
0 Upper income families save taxes over the long run if the taxes saved by
deposit, plus interest on those taxes, plus interest accrued by the deposit exceed the
taxes incurred at the deposit's withdrawal, whether by the family or by the child at
his departure, thereby shifting an additional share of the total tax burden of the
country to those who do not use the Account. The Commission overtly accepts vertical
inequity in the use of the adult's Account. However, that Account does not earn
interest and is presented as principally an income averaging measure. Id. at 259-60,
269-73, 278-79.
251 3 REPORr 147.
252 The Report deals with trusts at length, at 4 RE'ORT 149-211, and remarks
that "[t]he trust should be regarded as an instrument to be employed for good per-
sonal or business reasons and should not be permitted to be used as a tax-avoidance
device." Id. at 151.
2-53 Id. at 157.
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this rule. First, where the property is "distributable currently" the
beneficiary can elect that the corpus be taxable to himself, in which
case the trust pays no initial tax. 54 Second, if the property is not
distributable currently and is to be accumulated for the benefit of a
prospective beneficiary who can be identified with reasonable probabil-
ity, that beneficiary may elect that the trust pay the initial tax at the
rate which would be applicable if he received the property directly.
5
Suppose a grandfather wishes to leave a farm to his grandson in trust
to be given over to the grandson when he leaves his family unit. At
creation the trust must thus pay a tax based on either the 50 per cent
rate or the rate of the grandson's family.256 In either case the trust
is entitled to pay the tax in installments over five or ten years.2 5 Upon
distribution of the farm to the grandson he includes its value in his
income, and receives credit for the initial tax. If the initial tax paid
by the trust exceeds his tax payable apart from the credit, he is entitled
to a refund."
Therefore a prospective donor of a gift in kind to a dependent
child is wise to choose a trust in lieu of an immediate gift. This is
also true with respect to appreciating property. If a direct gift is made,
the family must either recognize its value as income or avoid recog-
nition and effectuate a pass-through to the child by depositing an
equivalent sum in the Account. In order to make the deposit the
family may have to sell the gift, or borrow on it. If a trust is created,
the pass-through can be effectuated without use of the Account." 9
However, the initial tax on the corpus of the trust may be heavy,
depending on the family's other income and the value of the corpus,
and may jeopardize both the appreciation and investment prospects
of the corpus and, in the case of a gift in kind, the capacity of the
trust to pay the tax without selling part of the corpus. Of course, the
settlor may be able to endow the trust with sufficient cash assets to
cover the initial tax. More likely, he will be inclined to defer dis-
position of the property until the child has come of age.260
254 Id.
255 Id. An amount is currently distributable if "it is either distributed in that year
or the beneficiary has a right to enforce payment of it in the year." Id. at 153. "An
individual would be a prospective beneficiary of an amount if it was indefeasibly vested
in him, or if he would be entitled under the trust instrument to receive the amount,
if he was living, not later than the death of an income beneficiary who was older than
he by at least ten years or on his attaining a specified age not exceeding forty years,
or on the later of these events if both conditions are applicable." Id. at 159-60.2 5 6 See id. at 172. If the trust pays at the family rate, it does so on the basis of
the increment in taxes the family would pay if the corpus were reported as income by
the family. Id. at 160.
25 Id. at 172.
=9 Id. at 161-62.
259 Such a trust's immunity to the double tax may be compared to that of the
Account: the assets are not at the family's immediate disposal and are kept "on ice."
Also, conceptually, trust assets from non-family settlors are not property taken from
the family unit. See 3 REPORT 137.
260 The transfer cannot be deferred beyond the prospective donor's death, however,
unless he can pass property to his spouse for subsequent transfer.
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Finally, it is difficult to rationalize the pass-through treatment
that the Account also can provide for the child's earned income in
excess of $500 and outside small gifts. First, a child receives sizable
amounts for support and education each year he is a member of the
family unit. This is supplied for the most part by his parents; the
parents in effect give the deposited sums to the child by allowing him
to make the deposit rather than requiring him to contribute to his own
support. Second, it is reasonable to assume that in the usual case a
child does in fact consume his earnings 26' and small gifts in the form
of self-support in lower income families and leisure and luxuries in
upper income families. Thus there is no need to effectuate a pass-
through. Third, to the extent that some actual pass-through exists,
the proposed $5,000 lifetime gift exemption should more than cover
it. 2 A pass-through of small gifts and earned income does not reflect
the actual functioning of the family and gives an unfair advantage to
upper income families. Only large gifts are likely to be passed through
in fact, and only they are likely to be inhibited by failure to get pass-
through treatment.
Two proposals for restructuring the Commission's approach to
the pass-through should be considered. First, the Account is too
restrictive in locking in the deposited funds from investment and ap-
preciation and in being limited to cash deposits. To alleviate the
lock-in effect, the government could establish an agency empowered
to act as an investment broker for the funds. More practicable, and
of more appeal to private enterprise instincts, would be to allow invest-
ment in suitably regulated private investment companies to qualify for
Account-like treatment. Further, the Account's discrimination against
gifts in kind seems unjustified. To effect the pass-through of gifts
in kind, a donor under the present proposal can create a trust with the
corpus to be distributed upon the child's coming of age. If the trust
has sufficient liquid assets with which to pay the initial tax, the pass-
through can be effected and the corpus is ultimately taxed only once
at the adult beneficiary's rates. However, sufficient liquid assets may
not be available and, in any event, there is a substantial disincentive
to the prospective donor. To put gifts in kind on a parity with cash
gifts, provision should be made for the pass-through, tax-free until the
child comes of age, of gifts in kind placed in the hands of suitable
(preferably institutional) trustees.
The second major difficulty with the Commission's proposal for
implementation of the pass-through principle is the treatment of large
gifts to the child that are not deposited in the Account. Deferred
recognition of amounts deposited until their withdrawal upon the
child's departure from the family is certainly reasonable-the funds
261 GRovEs, supra note 1, at 100-01.
262 See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
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are put "on ice" until the child comes of age and in a conceptual sense
are not received until then. However, it seems unreasonable to impose
a double tax on a large gift simply because it is not deposited. Instead,
provision should be made for the family to take the gift into the unit,
and thus into income; then if the child takes the property from the
family unit he should be allowed to do so tax-free, at least, or possibly
with a potential refund based on the disparity between his rates and
those at which the family initially paid a tax on the property. The
latter is the approach used by the Commission for trusts where an
initial tax is paid by the trust and the corpus is later distributed; 2"
the former would amount to the exaction of a price for the use of the
property and is not essentially alien to the Commission's Account
inasmuch as deposits in the Account can be withdrawn at any time
and are thus readily available to the family.2
Turning briefly to the specific context of the Internal Revenue
Code and its transfer taxes, several conclusions appear. First, because
a transfer to a child is not treated as income to him or the family and
because the transfer tax burden is generally less than an income tax
on the transfer would be, immunity for parent-child transfers is not
as compelling. Second, since the Code taxes transfers to the trans-
feror, effectuation of the pass-through of large gifts from persons
outside the family by the initial transfer tax seems appropriate. Third,
the Commission's analysis of the family's unity suggests that parental
gifts and bequests to children should be recognized at the child's coming
of age, rather than at the earlier time of transfer. Fourth, although
the position was rejected by the Commission, it has been argued
here 2 5 that remnants of earned income and small gifts taken by a
child upon leaving the family unit are in fact gifts from the parents.
Although probably not large in the aggregate, they should in theory
be recognized as such by the Code.
SUMMARY
The Royal Commission's family unit makes clear the need for
reform of the Internal Revenue Code's treatment of the family. Re-
liance on the economic and social unity of the family, vigorous efforts
to fashion an equitable allocation of the income tax burden among
various families, and attack on taxation of intrafamily property trans-
fers are all most appropriate.
The Commission has made an impressive start toward defining
and implementing the concepts of "progressive taxation" and "equity"
263 See text accompanying note 258 supra.
264 Of course, even if such a pass-through technique is implemented, there would
remain a substantial incentive to use the Account instead, thereby deferring taxation
on large gifts.
265 See text accompanying note 261 supra.
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through its specific yardsticks and sensitive adjustments to varying
individual and family configurations. However, its proposal is not
without difficulties. It fails to adjust for the expenses and lost imputed
income of working wives, and it unduly penalizes the married student.
Further, the Commission's treatment for property transfer pur-
poses of the child's transient membership in the family, while basically
sound, is at times harsh and unduly restrictive. Given the unity of
the family, transfer immunity is appropriate if not compelled. It is in
turn logical that parental gifts be recognized at the child's departure
from the family, and it is likewise appropriate to allow a pass-through
of assets acquired by a child while a member of his parents' unit but
that ultimately belong to him. The Commission errs, however, in
allowing a purported pass-through of small gifts and earned income
via the child's Account. More important, pass-through treatment
should be accorded large gifts to a child that are not deposited in the
Account by taxing the family at receipt of the gift, permitting tax-free
withdrawal when the child leaves the unit, and perhaps refunding to
the family at that time any tax paid on the gift in excess of that based
on the child's rate. And in any event, provision should be made to
allow gifts in kind (placed in trust) and large gifts placed in suitably
regulated investment companies to be treated like cash gifts placed in
the child's Account.
